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1Open Society Justice Initiative
Report on Developments
2005–2007
The Open Society Justice Initiative, an operational 
program of the Open Society Institute (OSI), pursues 
law reform activities grounded in the protection of 
human rights, and contributes to the development 
of legal capacity for open societies worldwide. 
The Justice Initiative combines litigation, legal 
advocacy, technical assistance, and the dissemination 
of knowledge to secure advances in the following 
priority areas: national criminal justice, international 
justice, freedom of information and expression, 
and equality and citizenship. It has projects in over 
70 countries and offi ces in Abuja, Budapest, 
and New York.
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THE RULE OF LAW 
GLOBALLY
ONE OF THE defi ning characteristics of the last 
half century has been the expansion of the 
rule of law into many corners of the globe. 
At mid-20th century, core rule of law 
principles—including an independent 
judiciary, due process, equal protection, and 
reasonably fair trials—were mere aspirations 
in most societies. But by century’s end, more 
than half the world’s population lived in 
countries whose legal systems aff orded at 
least some protection of individual rights. 
Increasing acceptance of the principle that 
governments and individuals alike are 
accountable to publicly known, nonarbitrary 
rules, manifested itself in numerous ways: the 
fall of dictatorships from Latin America to 
Eastern Europe; the growth of a transnational 
civil society movement for fundamental 
rights; the proliferation of donor assistance 
to legal institutions; and the establishment 
of international tribunals, including a 
permanent International Criminal Court, 
to try the most heinous crimes. Yet recent 
events, from Darfur to Abu Ghraib, show 
how far we have to go. Th is report on our 
recent activities looks at the Justice Initiative’s
contributions to the rule of law worldwide.
Portions of this introduction are included in an essay by 
Executive Director James A. Goldston published in Volume 
20 of the Harvard Human Rights Journal.
6I. The Rule of Law Movement
Th e successful spread of law-based governance is the 
result of eff orts by a wide array of actors. Th e process 
has been far from smooth, but it is possible to discern 
three main threads in the multifaceted movement to 
advance the rule of law. 
One strand, which commenced at the 
conclusion of the Second World War, focuses on the 
international architecture of norms and institutions. 
Th e complete breakdown of institutional order, 
and the barbarity of the war and its accompanying 
Holocaust, propelled the victorious Allies to construct 
a new global legal system—and, for the fi rst time, to 
codify recognition of fundamental human rights at 
its core. Th e founding document of the new age, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaimed 
it “essential . . . that human rights should be protected 
by the rule of law.” Ever since, the web of international 
rules and regulations has proliferated—on subjects 
ranging from monetary policy and international 
lending to arms control and human rights. 
A second dimension of the rule of law 
movement focuses on civil society, nourishing a wide-
ranging group of individuals and nongovernmental 
institutions committed to using, testing, and giving 
meaning to international rules through peaceful 
action. Amnesty International, the quintessential 
nongovernmental rights group, was born in 1961, 
but the focus of energy really began to shift  with 
the signing of the Helsinki Accords in 1975 by 35 
governments in Europe and North America. Few 
could have anticipated the galvanizing impact its 
human rights provisions would have upon an entire 
generation. Within a year, activists in Moscow 
were imprisoned for demanding that the Soviet 
government abide by its commitments. As their fate 
became known, a chain reaction of international 
proportions spawned the growth of a worldwide 
network. Over the next decade, fi rst dozens, then 
hundreds and ultimately thousands of people 
from Russia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America 
sought to hold their governments accountable for 
crimes committed by the state. By the early 1990s, 
independent civil society was an increasingly capable 
and infl uential member of the global body politic. 
A third branch of rule of law promotion seeks 
to fortify the capacity of governments to provide 
services, protect security, and enforce laws eff ectively 
in open societies. Th roughout the post-WWII period, 
but with increasing intensity in the 1980s and 1990s, 
Western donors poured money into judicial training 
seminars, police reform, and legal assistance programs 
to foster more eff ective and transparent states. 
By the end of the 20th century, the rule of law 
movement could claim partial credit for a series of 
advances in liberty and accountability across the 
globe. While there remained many uncompleted 
tasks, on the whole advocates were reasonably 
confi dent in their tools and their objectives, if 
not their timetable for success. With signifi cant 
exceptions, substantial areas of the world seemed to 
be clearly, if not always consistently, on a path toward 
law-based governance. 
Th e 9/11 attacks, and the chain of violence and 
overreaction they spawned, have only complicated 
the task of rule of law reformers. Th e long-term goals 
of elaborating and refi ning norms and standards, as 
well as enhancing both state and civil society capacity, 
remain. But a host of new challenges has arisen. Th ree 
stand out. 
First, how to compensate for the loss of U.S. 
leadership. Th e Bush administration’s embrace of 
extraordinary rendition, disappearance, and torture 
has crippled U.S. infl uence as a constructive force for 
human rights for some time to come. Th e shift ing 
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7global calculus of power is already evident in a newly 
assertive and repressive Russia, a worsening climate 
across broad swaths of the Middle East and Central 
Asia, and an increasingly aggressive China ready (like 
many Western predecessors) to sacrifi ce rights for 
resources from Sudan to Cambodia. 
Th e implications are clear. Rule of law advocates 
must cultivate alternative sources of moral, political, 
and fi nancial sustenance for their work. Europe 
is an obvious candidate, but it has too oft en failed 
to rise above the lowest common denominator in 
reaching a region-wide consensus. More generally, 
regional institutions such as the European Union, the 
Organization of American States, and the African 
Union should be pushed to act more consistently, 
and publicly, in defense of international human 
rights norms. Greater eff orts should be devoted to 
forging stronger and more representative networks 
of law reform advocates within, and beyond, national 
and regional borders. Reformers should seize the 
opportunity to build a more balanced, multipolar 
movement for justice, monopolized by no single 
model, and drawing on many. 
Second, the post-9/11 world has revealed the 
power of nonstate actors to threaten personal security 
on a global scale. Weak or failed states are a threat 
to everyone, and the quality of governance in far-
away lands has acquired new relevance. As a result, 
the potential constituency for rule of law reform has 
grown markedly. 
Th ird, how to avoid becoming so preoccupied 
with terrorism and counterterrorism that other 
problems that may aff ect more people more of the 
time are not overlooked. Terrorism is a genuine threat 
to human rights and open societies, and it clearly 
must be addressed. Nonetheless, a host of problems 
not directly linked to terrorism require attention, 
even if they do not grab the headlines. 
II. The Role of the Justice Initiative
Against this backdrop of progress and setbacks, the 
Justice Initiative seeks to address current challenges, 
even as we pursue the long-term goals of refi ning and 
elaborating international norms, and improving state 
and civil society capacity to apply them. A number of 
characteristics defi ne our work. 
First, although our headquarters is in the 
United States, our approach to law reform is expressly 
transnational. We forge coalitions of like-minded 
actors, and off er comparative advice and expertise, 
drawing upon a broad range of country and regional 
experience. Committed to the enforcement of 
international norms, we strive to shape reform 
initiatives that are driven by, and respond to, local 
demand and knowledge. 
Second, though our aspirations are oft en grand, 
we seek practical solutions and enforceable remedies. 
Th ird, underlying our work is a conviction that 
rule of law reform is as much art as science, as much 
about human beings as about law. Although we focus 
on legal redress, we recognize that lawyers and legal 
tools may not be the only—or the most appropriate—
responses to many problems. Indeed, some of the 
most successful reform eff orts involve a leap of 
faith—in the transformative power of courageous 
individuals to help bring the rule of law into being, 
by acting (sometimes at odds with reality on the 
ground) as if it mattered. Changes in laws and 
institutions are ultimately incomplete without 
changes in how people think about the law’s relevance 
to their daily lives.
Fourth, the Justice Initiative employs a variety 
of tools, including litigation, advocacy, technical 
assistance, research and monitoring, and capacity 
building. We oft en combine collaborative assistance 
with more confrontational tactics, including public 
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8criticism, and thereby seek to maximize our impact 
through the synergies among diff erent approaches. 
Fift h, a similar fl exibility underlies our choice 
of partners. While our point of departure is oft en 
other civil society organizations, including national 
and regional Soros foundations, the Justice Initiative 
undertakes projects as well with governments and 
intergovernmental bodies. Fostering the institutional 
transformation needed to trigger lasting changes in 
justice systems may require a mix of techniques and 
relationships that straddle what are oft en seen as 
divided realms.
Finally, we pursue a series of thematic goals, 
including the following:
• National criminal justice reform— 
Rationalizing and developing alternatives 
to pretrial detention; increasing access to 
competent legal representation for indigent 
criminal defendants, and improving 
civilian police oversight mechanisms. We 
have ongoing national projects in several 
countries in Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union, Mexico, and Nigeria, as well 
as comparative initiatives that span broader 
regions. 
• International justice—Reinforcing 
mechanisms of accountability for 
international crimes and breaches of state 
obligations, including international and 
hybrid criminal tribunals and regional 
human rights courts. Major eff orts combine 
hands-on technical assistance with broad 
public advocacy to support the International 
Criminal Court, the Extraordinary 
Chambers established to try surviving 
perpetrators of the Cambodian genocide, 
and the new African Court of Human 
and Peoples’ Rights. 
• Freedom of information and expression—
Facilitating government transparency, 
expanding access to information, and 
contesting undue restrictions on print and 
broadcast media. We have pioneered a global 
tool for monitoring access to information, 
and are promoting the development of legal 
standards to address the pervasive problem 
of fi nancial interference with freedom of 
the press. 
• Equality and citizenship—Combating racial 
discrimination, arbitrary denationalization 
and statelessness; and defending the rights 
of those most vulnerable to abuse, including 
racial and ethnic minorities and noncitizens.
 
• Legal capacity development—Developing the 
capacity of lawyers and law students to pursue 
legal advocacy supportive of a global open 
society, including through support for clinical 
legal education and human rights fellowships. 
• Anti-Corruption—Securing legal remedies for 
natural resource–related corruption. 
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Justice reform is a long-term process that oft en 
yields modest results and incremental change. And 
yet, since the end of 2002, working closely with 
other institutions, the Justice Initiative has achieved 
substantial progress in several areas. 
We have had a leading role in the proliferation 
of freedom of information laws, now in place in 
approximately 65 countries worldwide, and in 
promoting their implementation. We have been in 
the forefront of eff orts to improve the eff ectiveness of 
the International Criminal Court, the ad hoc criminal 
tribunals for Cambodia and Sierra Leone, and other 
international mechanisms of accountability for mass 
crimes. Our combined legal and advocacy campaign 
that helped lead to the arrest and prosecution of 
former Liberian President Charles Taylor for crimes 
against humanity is just one example of this work. 
We have led the way in challenging racial profi ling 
internationally and in combating racial segregation 
and discrimination in Europe.
We have undertaken pathbreaking litigation 
before regional tribunals in Africa, Europe, and 
Latin America that has helped to secure landmark 
judgments on issues of access to citizenship and 
freedom of information. We have assisted in the 
development of university-based legal clinics 
providing advice and assistance to under-served 
populations in more than 50 countries in Africa, 
Eastern Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, 
Southeast Asia, and the former Soviet Union. 
We have created, nourished, and helped train a 
network of human rights lawyers and practitioners 
now numbering more than 100 individuals from 
nearly 40 countries. We have played an instrumental 
role in strengthening new and existing human 
rights protection mechanisms in Africa by litigating 
signifi cant cases and forging civil society coalitions to 
monitor and publicize the work of these bodies. 
We have created and disseminated Indicators 
of Democratic Policing, an accountability tool to 
measure police responsiveness to the citizens they 
serve. We have contributed to institutional reforms 
in the legal systems of Bulgaria, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, Nigeria, and 
Ukraine, helping them expand government-provided 
legal aid and reduce reliance on pretrial detention. 
We have fostered a network of lawyers in Central Asia 
who seek concrete legal remedies for the torture and 
abuse of those in detention. We have contributed to 
the promulgation by a United Nations treaty body 
of a major set of principles outlawing discrimination 
against noncitizens. 
Looking ahead, the Justice Initiative will 
maintain its focus on situations where we can add 
value to what others are already doing. We are 
committed to ensuring that interventions in 
support of the rule of law are sustainable over time. 
And yet, we will continue to seize moments of 
opportunity that make change newly possible. 
We look forward to collaborating with local, national, 
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Ending Charles Taylor’s 
Asylum
No more the charismatic rebel in combat garb. No 
more bodyguards, ceremonial robes, or denials of gun 
running, diamond smuggling, and abducting children 
into militias. In August 2003, Charles Taylor fl ed 
war-torn Liberia, the land he once ruled by terror. 
He now lived in a seaside villa in Nigeria, provided to 
him by the government there. Protected by the villa’s 
walls—and the asylum granted to him by President 
Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria—Taylor scoffed at 
the indictment against him for war crimes. So the 
question became: What would it take to end Taylor’s 
asylum and bring him to justice? ✒
A F R I C A  P R O G R A M
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✒
Demands that Nigeria arrest Taylor and transfer him to the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone arose immediately aft er it 
became clear that Taylor was, indeed, in Nigeria. Th e Open 
Society Justice Initiative led the campaign to have him 
extradited. It gathered human rights advocates to examine 
the legal underpinnings of Taylor’s status in Nigeria, and 
they concluded that his asylum violated both Nigerian 
and international law. Th e Justice Initiative subsequently 
presented the Nigerian authorities with formal requests 
for a review of Taylor’s status, but these requests yielded 
nothing but silence. Even attempts by Justice Initiative 
representatives to discuss the matter with Nigerian 
government offi  cials came to nothing.
Th en, on May 13, 2004, David Anyaele and Emmanuel 
Egbuna—assisted by the Justice Initiative—initiated judicial 
review proceedings before Nigeria’s Federal High Court 
in Abuja to force the Nigerian government to lift  Taylor’s 
asylum and hand him over for trial. Anyaele and Egbuna 
had sound reasons to seek Taylor’s transfer to the Sierra 
Leone special court. Th e men were Nigerian citizens. 
Th ey had been eking out an existence as traders in Sierra 
Leone’s capital, Freetown, when, in 1999, they fell into the 
hands of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a rebel 
militia funded and controlled by Taylor. RUF soldiers 
hacked off  both of Anyaele’s hands, and mutilated Egbuna. 
Th eir only crime was Nigerian citizenship. Th e militia 
considered Nigerians enemies, because Nigerian offi  cers 
were commanding the multinational military contingent 
known as the Economic Community of West African 
States Monitoring Group, which was striving to bring some 
semblance of security to Sierra Leone. Th e RUF soldiers who 
chopped off  Anyaele’s hands told him to return to Nigeria 
and show everyone there what Liberia could do.
In order to draw public and offi  cial attention to the 
court case, Nigerian, Liberian, and international human 
rights advocates organized the Coalition Against Impunity 
(CAI), an umbrella group whose membership includes 
more than 345 NGOs from 17 African countries as well as 
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the Nigerian 
Coalition on the International Criminal Court, and the 
Transitional Justice Working Group in Liberia. Th e Justice 
Initiative was a founding member of CAI, conceiving and 
forging its formation and spearheading its advocacy work 
across West Africa. As the court case unfolded, CAI helped 
make the Nigerian public aware of Anyaele and Egbuna 
and the courage they were showing by coming forward, 
as plaintiff s, to demand Taylor’s handover in defi ance of 
President Obasanjo’s decision to grant him asylum. Senior 
government offi  cials who had previously ignored the case 
began to voice sympathy for Anyaele and Egbuna.
Only aft er the court proceedings commenced did 
Nigeria’s government formally admit that it had off ered 
Taylor asylum. A spokesman for Taylor asserted that Taylor’s 
stay in Nigeria was a political arrangement, something not 
subject to Nigeria’s judiciary, which eff ectively meant that 
Taylor even considered himself to be above the law of his 
host country. In November 2004, the Justice Initiative fi led 
an amicus curiae brief in support of Anyaele and Egbuna’s 
A F R I C A  P R O G R A M
Former Liberian President Charles Taylor being transferred 
in Liberia to a helicopter bound for Sierra Leone.
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application. Th e brief summarized the obligation states 
have to surrender or prosecute persons accused of serious 
international crimes and to deny refugee status to such 
accused, including Charles Taylor.
Nigeria’s government attempted to drag out the court 
proceedings and used police pressure in an attempt to 
intimidate CAI members. In July and August 2005, Nigeria’s 
State Security Service arrested a number of Nigerians who 
had been calling for Taylor’s arrest and extradition, holding 
them in custody for fi ve days. Security forces arrested Steve 
Omali and Michael Damisa and seized 10,000 copies of 
“Wanted” posters bearing Taylor’s picture—reprints of a 
poster Interpol had issued for Taylor in 2003. A day later, two 
persons claiming to be members of the State Security Service 
visited the Justice Initiative’s offi  ces, clearly in connection 
with its eff orts to spearhead the call to arrest Taylor. Th ese 
tactics backfi red, embarrassing the Nigerian government. 
Pressure from abroad and from within Nigeria and its 
government forced the leadership to end its surveillance and 
harassment activities.
In November 2005, aft er 18 months of legal wrangling, 
the Federal High Court ruled that Anyaele and Egbuna had 
legal standing as plaintiff s and that their suit could proceed. 
Th is ruling eff ectively removed any legal support for Taylor’s 
asylum in Nigeria, but the government appealed the ruling, 
thereby initiating new delays. In Liberia itself, however, 
CAI members were pushing the issue of Taylor’s extradition 
to the forefront of the political agenda. For months, CAI 
members called upon candidates running for offi  ce in 
Liberia to take a position on Taylor’s asylum in Nigeria and 
declare that, if elected, they would support demanding the 
warlord’s extradition to Liberia and transfer to Sierra Leone’s 
special court. On November 23, 2005, the state electoral 
commission declared Ellen Sirleaf Johnson to be the 
winner of Liberia’s presidential election. In March 2006, she 
offi  cially requested that Nigeria hand Taylor over. 
On March 17, 2006, President Obasanjo confi rmed 
that Nigeria had received Liberia’s request, but he notifi ed 
African leaders that Nigeria had not yet decided whether it 
would comply. By March 25, however, aft er representatives 
from Liberia and Nigeria met to discuss the question, 
Obasanjo had relented. Nigeria announced that it would 
allow the Liberian authorities to arrest Taylor. Th ree days 
later, Taylor disappeared from the walled villa on Nigeria’s 
seacoast. Nigerian border guards captured him at dawn on 
March 29, trying to cross Nigeria’s frontier into Cameroon. 
Th e Nigerian authorities placed Taylor on a plane to Liberia. 
Th ere, he was transferred to a waiting United Nations 
helicopter and transported to Sierra Leone to face charges. 
On June 20, 2006, the tribunal moved him to a more secure 
prison cell in the Netherlands. His trial began in Th e Hague 
in June 2007.
Th e civil society campaign waged by the Justice 
Initiative and other advocacy organizations to fl ush Charles 
Taylor out of hiding—including both the legal eff orts to 
have the Nigerian authorities quash his asylum and CAI’s 
public advocacy eff orts—played a key role in the sequence 
of events that led to his incarceration in a holding cell in Th e 
Hague. Th e campaign encouraged CAI to begin examining 
other cases involving leadership fi gures and human rights 
abuses in Africa, and the Justice Initiative will continue to 
provide resources and expertise to justice advocates working 
to bring human rights violators to trial.
A F R I C A  P R O G R A M
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Most of the Justice Initiative’s activity 
is organized by thematic (as opposed 
to geographic) areas. But because 
Africa is the nexus of so much of the 
organization’s activity, and because 
other foundations in the OSI network 
are so active there, the Justice 
Initiative operates a cross-cutting 
program focused on Africa.
The Open Society Justice Initiative 
supports institutions and norms in 
Africa that provide legal protections 
for people and advance human rights. 
The Justice Initiative also advocates 
for reforms that ensure more effective 
human rights protection and the 
application of existing human rights 
laws and norms. 
Advocacy priorities include 
aiding police reform and increasing 
accountability for national law 
enforcement and criminal justice 
systems; promoting the adoption 
of freedom of information laws in 
leading African countries; helping 
develop effective protection of 
citizenship rights in Africa; increasing 
the effectiveness and participation 
of African states in international 
justice; and working to reform the 
African regional human rights system, 
including the establishment of the 
African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights. 
The Justice Initiative’s work in Africa 
is shaped by conditions in the region. 
Political processes and government 
functions remain largely personalized 
and arbitrary in most countries, 
Women carrying fi rewood outside 
their camp for internally displaced 
persons in Darfur, Sudan.
Pretrial detainees in Nigeria and 
elsewhere are often held under harsh 
conditions.
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while institutional foundations are 
quite weak. As a result, abuse of 
state power continues to go largely 
unchecked. 
Offi cial secrecy and opaque 
government practices are major 
obstacles to accountable governance 
in Africa. In some countries, 
mechanisms of law enforcement 
and accountability are completely 
dysfunctional. State failure on this 
scale creates room for militias and 
nonstate actors to take over many 
of the roles of the state, creating a 
context that is ripe for civil confl ict 
and citizenship-based discrimination. 
International justice mechanisms 
are often required to address these 
problems.
The primary tools employed by 
the Africa program are litigation, 
institution- and coalition-building, and 
public advocacy. The program supports 
national and regional actors who can 
work effectively to improve justice 
outcomes in Africa. 
The Justice Initiative also plays 
a leading role in helping reform the 
institutions of the African regional 
human rights system, including the 
African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights and the African Court 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
The following are several highlights 
of the Africa Program’s recent work:
Charles Taylor Rendition
International justice in Africa took 
a major step forward in 2006 when 
Charles Taylor, the former president of 
Liberia and an accused war criminal, 
was handed over by Nigeria, where 
he had been granted asylum, to 
Liberia and then to the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone (SCSL). The end 
of Taylor’s impunity was the direct 
result of advocacy by victims and 
human rights workers in West Africa—
advocacy that was largely coordinated 
by the Justice Initiative.
For years, Taylor lived in a seaside 
villa in Nigeria, despite protests by 
the Justice Initiative and others that 
his asylum violated Nigerian law. The 
Justice Initiative helped bring a lawsuit 
in Nigeria against Taylor, on behalf 
of two victims who were mutilated 
by Taylor-backed militants in Sierra 
Leone. The case helped crystallize 
opposition to Taylor’s asylum and the 
Nigerian court sided with the victims, 
ruling they had standing to challenge 
Taylor’s asylum. This decision marked 
the beginning of the end of Taylor’s 
freedom. He now faces 11 charges 
of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. To read more about the 
Justice Initiative’s pursuit of Charles 
Taylor, please see Civil Society 
Presssure: Ending Charles Taylor’s 
Asylum on page 11.
The Darfur Consortium
To help end the genocide in Darfur 
and bring those responsible to justice, 
the Justice Initiative in 2004 helped 
organize an Extraordinary Session of 
the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights focused on 
Darfur, which resulted in the creation 
of the Darfur Consortium. Currently 
cochaired by the Justice Initiative, the 
Darfur Consortium enables over 100 
African civil society groups to provide 
their perspective on the crisis and 
to present a unifi ed front calling for 
effective protection for the people of 
Darfur and international accountability 
for the crimes committed there. 
Coalition for the African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights
The Coalition for the African Court 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights was 
established in 2003, in part through 
the efforts of the Open Society 
Justice Initiative and INTERIGHTS. By 
2006, the coalition comprised over 
500 NGOs and independent national 
human rights institutions within and 
outside Africa. The coalition advocates 
for full ratifi cation of the protocol 
establishing the African Court by all 
53 African Union member states. 
The coalition also assists the court in 
creating standards for selecting judges 
and works to ensure that the court is 
transparent and fully accessible to civil 
society organizations.
Reform of Legal Aid Delivery and 
Pretrial Detention in Nigeria
In 2005, the Open Society Justice 
Initiative, in collaboration with Nigeria’s 
Legal Aid Council and the Nigeria 
police force, launched a multifaceted 
project to reform pretrial detention 
and legal aid service delivery in 
Nigeria. The project addresses 
deep-rooted problems in Nigeria’s 
criminal justice system through 
better information management 
and improved communication and 
coordination between the criminal 
justice agencies made possible 
by CRIMSYS, a software program 
developed by the Justice Initiative. 
The project also fosters effective 
legal representation for arrested 
suspects and detained defendants 
through a “Duty Solicitor Scheme” 
that places lawyers on 24-hour call at 
designated police stations to provide 
legal assistance to suspects. These 
efforts are complemented by advocacy 
to improve Nigeria’s legal aid law. To 
read more about the Justice Initiative’s 
efforts to reform pretrial detention in 
Nigeria, please see Arrested in Nigeria: 
The Sentence Comes First—Years in 
Pretrial Detention on page 57.
A F R I C A  P R O G R A M
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It is a simple identity card, in Swahili a kitambulisho: 
handwritten ink-pen letters, a registration number, a 
photo and fi ngerprint of the holder, a signature of the 
registration offi cer. Receive the kitambulisho, possess 
it, and you can place your child in a good school, 
obtain free health care, receive a passport perhaps, 
and enjoy all the other rights and benefi ts that 
citizenship in Kenya entails. ✒
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But lose the kitambulisho, let it drop from your pocket 
onto a dusty street, fail to notice fi ngers picking it from 
your handbag on the citi hoppa minibus that bounces from 
Kibera into central Nairobi, and, if you are a minority 
Nubian, you will for years confront glowering eyes and 
batteries of questions: 
“Who are you?” 
“Where do you hail from?” 
“Where is your birth certifi cate?” 
“What was your grandfather’s place of birth?”
“Where were your father and mother born?” 
“Do you have their birth certifi cates?” 
“Why not?” 
Lose the kitambulisho and—if you are a Kenyan 
Nubian—you must fear arrest for loitering or worse. While 
other Kenyans who lose the card can readily secure a 
replacement, you cannot because the application form asks 
for your “tribe.” To declare your tribe is Nubian is to invite 
rejection, in view of the pervasive hostility toward Nubians 
in much of Kenya. Even your name is a likely giveaway, 
indicating to the clerk that you are not a “real” Kenyan, and 
hence do not deserve a new kitambulisho. Without it, you 
will not travel outside Kenya’s borders, because you cannot 
qualify for a passport. You will watch other parents send 
their children to the good schools and the free state hospital. 
You will hear that their children have received scholarships 
to study abroad while yours linger in Kibera.
Kenya’s Nubians, more than 100,000 of them, 
have descended from soldiers whom the British Empire 
transferred, in some instances over a century ago, from 
Sudan to Kenya. Many received permits to settle outside 
Nairobi on the hillside known as Kibera during the 
1920s. Others arrived in Kibera in the 1950s, during 
Kenya’s rebellion against colonial rule, because the British 
considered them loyal. Kenya won independence in 1963. 
Th e British departed. And the Nubians’ small subsistence-
farming plots have been engulfed by the sprawling slum that 
Kibera has become—a warren of poverty where 600,000 of 
Nairobi’s three million residents reside.
Like almost all of Kenya’s Nubians, Abdalla Yasuf and 
Shafi r Ali Hussein were born in Kenya. Yasuf, born in 1935, 
has been a life-long resident of Kibera. He has fathered 
seven children and has several grandchildren, all of them 
born in Kenya. He had a kitambulisho, acquired in 1951 and 
updated in 1980 and 1996; and he even received a one-year 
passport in January 2004. Soon aft erward, however, Yasuf 
lost his identity card. On July 28, 2004, he applied for a 
replacement. He has yet to receive it.
“I cannot be employed,” Yasuf says. “I cannot use a 
bank. I can be arrested for not having the identity card. 
I have always done my civic duty and voted like a good 
citizen, but I could not vote during the 2005 referendum 
on the proposed constitution of Kenya. Th is was shocking 
to me. I had a passport but could not use it to vote. I was 
frustrated because I could not express my opinion on that 
constitution when it mattered, because the government was 
delaying giving me my ID. Th is delay has not been explained 
to me by any offi  cial, but I deem it selective, deliberate, and 
discriminatory toward me because I am a Nubian.”
Shafi r Ali Hussein’s great-grandfather was a soldier 
in the King’s African Rifl es when he was ordered to Kenya. 
Hussein’s grandfather, born in Kenya, also served in the 
King’s African Rifl es. Hussein’s father was born in Kibera. 
And Hussein was born there in 1961. He has lived there 
almost ever since. His daughter was born there. 
In about 1987, Hussein received a job off er from a 
friend of his aunt. Th e position was in Saudi Arabia, and 
the pay would have allowed him to move his family to a 
better house. 
Hussein was excited. He went to apply for a passport. 
He submitted the completed passport application form and 
returned, as instructed, aft er a few weeks, and again aft er 
a few weeks more, and again, and again until, aft er fi ve 
months of returning for a passport never issued, he saw the 
job in Saudi Arabia go to someone else. Hussein was angry. 
Gone was the good job—and with it the chance to move 
his family to a better place. About a year later, he returned 
to the immigration department. His passport application 
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had disappeared. He returned, as instructed, in a week. He 
learned his fi le had been lost. His original birth certifi cate 
was inside. Fill out more forms. Come back . . . come back . . . 
come back. Hussein abandoned hope. 
“Applying for a birth certifi cate is a headache and I do 
not want to go through it,” he says. “Th e reason that there 
are obstacles is because being a Muslim is a global headache 
and being a Nubian is a headache in Kenya. I feel as if there 
is no help for me. My feeling of patriotism is gone. Unless 
you have a friend who knows someone in government or 
who is in government, your problem cannot get solved.”
Kibera is far from a hospital. So Hussein’s daughter 
was born at home and he has had to apply for her birth 
certifi cate without the support of the hospital clerks.
“I was told to go to city hall,” he says. “At city hall, I 
was asked for my wife’s clinic card and my daughter’s clinic 
card. I brought both these cards back but I was told that 
they were not stamped. I had to return to the hospital and 
get them stamped. I took the stamped cards back to city 
hall but I could not fi nd the person I was dealing with. Aft er 
some visits, I found the offi  cer and he told me to fi ll a form 
B3. Th e form asked for names of the child, the father, and 
the mother and the date of birth of the child. I fi lled out 
the form. I then had to take the form to the chief and the 
subchief for signatures. I returned the form to city hall on 
Tuesday, February 4, 2006.” 
He is still waiting for a response. “Th e government has 
neglected us,” Hussein says. “Th is is because Nubians are a 
small percentage of the population here and so they have no 
political power. Kibera is neglected because Nubians have 
no political support. Development only happens where the 
people of a member of parliament are. I don’t think that 
anything will change.” 
More than 11 million people around the globe 
are eff ectively stateless like Abdalla Yasuf and Shafi r Ali 
Hussein. From Kenya to the Dominican Republic, national 
governments are manipulating citizenship laws to relegate 
members of entire ethnic groups—people born and raised 
inside their country’s borders—to statelessness, stripping 
them of the fundamental rights to political participation, 
freedom of movement, education, and employment. As 
never before, the right to citizenship is under threat. 
Since the collapse of communism in Europe, ethnic 
nationalism has led to the exclusion of minorities from 
citizenship in a number of new or successor states. In 
Africa, ethnic tensions arising from decolonization and 
state-building, combined with the growing signifi cance 
of political rights in emerging democracies, have driven 
armed confl ict and forced racial and ethnic minorities 
to the margins of society. In Asia and the Middle East, 
discriminatory citizenship laws perpetuate the inequalities 
women suff er and disenfranchise minority ethnic groups. 
Stateless people are subject to social exclusion, sexual and 
physical violence, and other human rights violations, and 
fall outside the protection and assistance of aid agencies and 
the United Nations citizenship policy. 
In Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritania, Morocco, 
Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe, the Justice Initiative is working with local 
partners to document patterns of ethnic, racial, gender, and 
citizenship-based discrimination, identify opportunities for 
litigation to challenge discriminatory laws and practices, and 
advocate for comprehensive antidiscrimination protections 
based upon international and regional standards. 
Th e Justice Initiative and several Soros foundations, 
including the Open Society Initiative for East Africa, are 
also working to help the stateless of Kenya, including the 
Nubians, to organize themselves, to campaign for access to 
citizenship, and to fi ght for their right to the simple card, the 
kitambulisho.
Kenyan Nubians line up to vote in Nairobi.
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Ethnic Profi ling 
Is Pervasive—and 
Ineffective
August 8, 2000: A bomb blows up inside a 
pedestrian tunnel in the Pushkinskaya Metro 
station, killing 13 people and injuring 118 more. 
February 5, 2001: A terrorist conceals a bomb 
under a bench at the Belorusskaya station; the 
explosion wounds nine people. ✒
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October 19, 2002: One person dies 
when a bomb explodes in a fast-food 
restaurant at the Yugo-Zapadnaya 
station. 
February 6, 2004: A bomb blast 
kills over 60 people in a train tunnel 
near the Avtozavodskaya station. 
August 29, 2004: Less than a week 
after explosive devices brought 
down two airplanes after take-off 
from Domodedovo Airport, a suicide 
bomber kills 10 people at the 
Rizhskaya station. ✒
Terrorism has scarred Moscow and its vast Metro 
system, despite a massive security presence and laws that 
give the police broad authority to stop passengers and check 
their documents. During the hours before the terrorist 
attacks of the past seven years, it is safe to assume that 
the police were acting as they would at any other time. 
Uniformed offi  cers were patrolling each of the city’s Metro 
stations. Th ey were approaching passengers at entrances 
and exits, in dimly lit passageways, and on vast staircases 
under brilliant crystal chandeliers. Th ey were checking 
identifi cation papers against the backdrop of socialist realist 
murals. And, whether they were simply following orders or 
working to augment miserable salaries by harvesting small 
bribes from people whose papers were not in order, these 
police offi  cers were using ethnic profi ling to pick out and 
question people who appeared to be members of minority 
groups from Central Asia and the Caucasus. 
But ethnic profi ling did not prevent the bloodshed and 
loss of life. 
Anecdotal accounts of the racism that pervades 
Russia and the authorities’ tolerance of racist violence and 
offi  cial discrimination led the Open Society Justice Initiative 
to undertake a study of ethnic profi ling by police in the 
Moscow Metro system during the summer of 2005. Th e 
study, conducted in partnership with the Russian human 
rights NGO JURIX and Lamberth Consulting, concluded 
that ethnic profi ling in the Metro was widespread yet 
ineff ective, resulting in the discovery of very few violations 
of a law.
Ethnic Profi ling: 
From the Anecdotal to the
Statistically Sound
Th e Moscow Metro Monitoring Study was the fi rst 
study outside the United States and United Kingdom to 
apply a rigorous methodology known as “observational 
benchmarking” to assess ethnic profi ling. Th e study’s 
designers chose to monitor exits at 15 Moscow Metro 
stations, because the stations had a high level of passenger 
traffi  c and a stable police presence, and the exits were in 
areas where monitors could consistently observe the actions 
of the police in an unobtrusive manner. Taken together, 
these stations also attract a broad spectrum of the city’s 
people: one of the stations was located at an open-air 
market, three were located at railway terminals, three at 
bus terminals, four in the downtown district, and four in 
residential neighborhoods. 
Th e study’s designers trained monitors to survey the 
characteristics of the people using the stations, to observe 
the police stopping people passing out of the stations, to 
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record data about these police stops, and to interview a 
sampling of the individuals whom the police had stopped. 
To determine whether the police were disproportionately 
stopping members of a certain ethnic group at the Metro 
exits, the study also had to measure the ethnic composition 
of the sample population under scrutiny. Th is measurement 
is the “observational benchmark.” 
Th e monitors classifi ed individual Metro passengers 
in three distinct ethnic categories to mirror what the 
study’s designers posited to be the stereotypes employed 
by the police in linking physical appearance to ethnicity 
and national origin. Th e fi rst category consisted of “Slavs,” 
namely those individuals with fair complexion who appear 
to be ethnic Russians, Ukrainians, and Byelorussians. Th e 
second category comprised “minorities,” encompassing 
people who appeared to be members of the national 
minorities of the former Soviet Union, namely people 
hailing from the Caucasus and Central Asia. Individuals 
in this category are typically identifi ed as having a darker 
complexion than individuals of Slavic appearance, with 
darker hair and some pronounced facial features. Th e 
third category was classifi ed as “other.” Th is last group was 
designated to encompass all individuals who appeared 
to come from outside the territory of the former Soviet 
Union, including Africans, East Asians, Western Europeans, 
Americans, and others not included in the fi rst two 
categories. During the monitoring, only a minuscule 
number of people—170 out of 33,891 individuals in one 
aspect of the survey—were identifi ed as “other.” 
Th e monitors conducted interviews with selected 
people whom the police had stopped, in order to determine 
these individuals’ perceptions of their encounter with 
the police. Th e monitors asked these respondents a set of 
questions, including whether the police had stopped them 
before and, if so, how oft en it had happened. Th e monitors 
also asked whether the respondents’ papers were currently 
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A police offi cer checks the documents of a man at a Moscow Metro station in November 2002.
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in order, whether the police had confi rmed the status of 
their papers during the stop, whether the police had behaved 
courteously to them, whether they had paid a fi ne, and why 
the police had let them go.
The Results: 
An Unambiguous Case 
of Discrimination
Th e Moscow Metro Monitoring Study showed conclusively 
that the police in the Metro use ethnic profi ling. Th e 
monitors at the 15 stations observed and classifi ed 33,760 
individuals to benchmark ethnicity and 32,686 individuals 
to benchmark gender/age. Th e benchmarking concluded 
that the passenger population of Moscow’s Metro is heavily 
Slavic and that Slavic riders constituted 95.4 percent of 
all riders at the 15 stations. Th e monitors observed 1,523 
police stops and conducted 367 interviews with selected 
individuals whom the police had stopped. 
Th e study found that, although persons of non-Slavic 
appearance constituted only 4.6 percent of those emerging 
through the exits of the 15 selected Metro stations, these 
people accounted for fully 50.9 percent of those persons 
whom the police stopped. In other words, people who 
appeared to be non-Slavic were, on average, 21.8 times 
more likely to be stopped than people who appeared to be 
Slavic. At one station, Medvedkovo, people who appeared to 
be non-Slavs were 85 times more likely to be stopped than 
people who appeared to be Slavs. 
Th e ratios in Moscow refl ect the most extreme ethnic 
profi ling ever documented through a statistical survey 
of the practice. For the sake of comparison, ratios above 
2.0 typically indicate that there is potential targeting of 
minorities for police stops. Surveys of ethnic or racial 
profi ling in the United States and the United Kingdom show 
that, at most, police are four to fi ve times more likely to 
stop persons who appear to be members of minority groups 
than persons who appear to be members of the majority 
population. 
Th e most important piece of information produced 
by observational monitoring of ethnic profi ling is the “hit 
rate” associated with the police stops, or the rate at which 
the police discover a breach of the law through their stops. 
Th e results of the Moscow Metro Monitoring Study clearly 
demonstrate that the police are wasting their time and eff orts. 
In the overwhelming majority of instances, the police simply 
released those persons they had stopped, and only 3 percent 
of the police stops revealed an administrative infraction 
like possessing improper documents. Th e clear pattern 
that emerged from the study was that police offi  cers stop a 
rider, examine his or her identity papers, and then release 
him or her without recording any information. However, 
the overwhelming proportion (89 percent) of the riders 
interviewed said the police had been courteous to them.
Ethnic Profi ling Does Not Prevent Terrorism. Th e low 
hit rate measured by the Moscow Metro Monitoring Study 
should be a reason for concern among Russian political 
leaders, police administrators, the ministers charged 
with maintaining public security, and members of the 
Russian general public. Fruitless document checks and 
discriminatory harassment of minority group members 
divert law enforcement eff orts from the eff ective prevention 
and investigation of acts of terrorism like those that claimed 
so many lives at Pushkinskaya station, the Belorusskaya 
station, and the other sites in Moscow. 
Russia is not alone in its mistaken use of ethnic 
profi ling. Aft er 9/11, the United States government also 
embarked on three law enforcement campaigns purportedly 
as counterterrorism pursuits; these campaigns explicitly 
targeted Arab, Muslim, and South Asian men. In an 
article in the New York Review of Books on March 9, 2006, 
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Police offi cers patrol an underground station in Moscow in 
January 2007.
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David Cole summed up the resounding failure of this 
discriminatory eff ort as follows: “Of the 80,000 Arabs and 
Muslim foreign nationals who were required to register 
aft er September 11, the 8,000 called in for FBI interviews, 
and more than 5,000 locked up in preventive detention, 
not one stands convicted of a terrorist crime today. In what 
has surely been the most aggressive national campaign of 
ethnic profi ling since World War II, the government’s record 
is 0 for 93,000.” Many law enforcement offi  cials argue that 
behavioral criteria, rather than race or ethnicity, are more 
eff ective for picking out persons likely to be intending to 
commit criminal acts or terrorist attacks.
Ethnic Profi ling Is Illegal. A number of core international 
human rights norms prohibiting racial and ethnic 
discrimination are relevant to ethnic profi ling. For example, 
the United Nations Race Convention prohibits racial 
discrimination with respect to “freedom of movement” 
and the “right to equal treatment before the tribunals 
and all other organs administering justice.” Provisions of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
prohibit racial discrimination, including with respect 
to arrest, detention, freedom of movement, and the 
administration of justice. Th e Program of Action of the 
UN World Conference Against Racism in 2000 endorsed 
these universal standards when it urged “states to design, 
implement, and enforce eff ective measures to eliminate the 
phenomenon popularly known as ‘racial profi ling.’”
Ethnic Profi ling Alienates Minority Group Members. 
Baseless targeting of innocent members of a racial and 
ethnic community also breeds fear and suspicion of the 
police. By undermining relations between law enforcement 
offi  cials and institutions and law-abiding members of 
minority communities, ethnic profi ling has the perverse 
eff ect of ultimately decreasing public safety for all. It makes 
law-abiding members of minority groups less likely to 
speak up about members of their community who might 
be engaging in criminal behavior. Th e Moscow Metro 
Monitoring Study was not designed to measure corruption. 
But interviews with persons who were subject to police 
stops and with members of the families of police offi  cers 
indicate that a key motivating factor for conducting these 
stops is the opportunity to supplement meager police 
salaries by demanding bribes in exchange for sparing their 
victims arrest, detention, harassment, and possibly worse.
Th e Open Society Justice Initiative and its partners 
are working to convince Russia’s political leaders and 
law enforcement authorities to stop the costly and 
counterproductive use of ethnic profi ling. Losing the 
struggle against terrorism is too high a price to pay 
for allowing racism to dampen the eff ectiveness of law 
enforcement methods.
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Interior Ministry troops stand watch in a Moscow Metro station in February 2004.
Equality and Citizenship 
Program
The Justice Initiative combats 
discrimination against racial and ethnic 
minorities, and promotes the right 
to citizenship. Although national and 
international law forbids discrimination 
on a growing number of grounds, the 
struggle for equality is far from over. 
Despite an international consensus 
against it, governments continue to 
perpetuate discrimination by ignoring or 
selectively enforcing legal prohibitions. 
The Justice Initiative is committed to 
exposing, documenting, and challenging 
discriminatory practices, whether 
overt (such as the demolition of Roma 
houses by Russian authorities) or 
more subtle (such as ethnic profi ling 
by police in much of Europe). Acting 
with local lawyers and advocacy 
groups, the Equality and Citizenship 
Program works toward enforcement of 
non-discrimination standards through 
advocacy, litigation, and research. 
Following are several examples 
of work in the area of equality and 
citizenship: 
Using the Courts
The Justice Initiative is pursuing 
litigation to combat racial 
discrimination in a number of 
jurisdictions. In Russia, the Justice 
Initiative fi led an application with the 
European Court of Human Rights on 
behalf of 33 Roma whose homes in 
the Kaliningrad region were bulldozed 
and set afi re by police and local 
government offi cials yelling racist 
insults and threatening them with 
machine guns. The application seeks 
a declaration by the court that the 
Russian government has breached 
numerous provisions of the European 
Convention of Human Rights. 
The Justice Initiative is also co-
counsel, with the European Roma 
Rights Centre, in D.H. and Others 
v. Czech Republic, a landmark 
case before the European Court of 
Human Rights that seeks to end the 
practice—common in several Central 
and Eastern European countries—of 
segregating Roma children in schools 
for the mentally disabled, regardless 
of their actual intellectual abilities. 
The Justice Initiative is cocounsel 
in Rosalind Williams v. Spain, the fi rst-
ever legal challenge to racial profi ling 
fi led with an international human rights 
tribunal—in this case, the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee. 
Williams v. Spain contests a ruling by 
the Spanish Constitutional Court, which 
held that police could target blacks 
for identity checks because racial 
appearance is a proxy for immigration 
status. In highlighting the problem 
of racial profi ling in Europe, the case 
seeks clarifi cation that race may not be 
used as a criterion in police stops.
The Justice Initiative’s Contemporary 
Discrimination in Europe project 
pursues litigation in national and 
European courts to realize the 
potential of new EU equality directives 
and to highlight the use of law as a 
tool for positive change. A particular 
In some countries, it is nearly 
impossible for ethnic minorities to 
get birth certifi cates, passports, 
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focus is discrimination against 
Muslims or people perceived as 
Muslims, whether rooted in racial 
prejudice, religious intolerance, or 
competing visions of gender equality. 
Documenting the Problem
Discrimination by law enforcement 
offi cials and the phenomenon of 
ethnic profi ling are widespread but 
little understood. In Russia, the 
Justice Initiative conducted a study of 
ethnic profi ling by police in Moscow 
that found rampant discrimination. 
The study, published as Ethnic Profi ling 
in the Moscow Metro, documented 
a stunning disparity: Moscow Metro 
riders who look non-Slavic are over 
20 times more likely to be stopped by 
police than riders who look Slavic. To 
read more about the Moscow study, 
please see On the Moscow Metro: 
Ethnic Profi ling Is Pervasive—and 
Ineffective on page 21.
The Justice Initiative publication “I 
Can Stop and Search Whoever I Want”: 
Police Stops of Ethnic Minorities in 
Bulgaria, Hungary and Spain presented 
the fi ndings from research carried out 
by the Justice Initiative and its national 
partners establishing that police 
offi cers in all three countries subject 
Roma and immigrants of ethnic minority 
origin to ethnic profi ling. The report is 
part of an ongoing, multipronged effort 
to raise awareness of the prevalence 
of ethnic profi ling by police throughout 
Europe. The Strategies for Effective 
Police Stop and Search project, another 
major component of Justice Initiative 
antidiscrimination efforts, seeks to 
improve police relations with minority 
communities, including Roma, through 
more accountable and effective use 
of police stops, identity checks, and 
searches.
Focus on Citizenship
Equal treatment is an especially 
diffi cult challenge where citizenship 
is concerned. Because states 
traditionally enjoy broad discretion over 
access to citizenship, and citizenship 
is a foundation for the exercise of 
many rights, people not recognized as 
citizens are especially vulnerable to 
discrimination. Today, the human right 
to citizenship—that is, the right to 
belong to a nation state and enjoy its 
protections—is under threat as never 
before. 
Around the world, racial and 
ethnic minorities are increasingly 
denied or stripped of citizenship 
through mass expulsion, legislation, 
arbitrary administrative action, or 
the application of insurmountable 
bureaucratic requirements, in direct 
contravention of Article 15 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
Discrimination based on citizenship 
fuels the growth of statelessness in 
countries as disparate as Bhutan, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
the Dominican Republic, and Latvia. 
Stateless individuals are often subject 
to deportation without notice. They 
wield no political power, and are 
unable to participate in the most 
fundamental civic decision-making 
processes. They are systematically 
deprived of public goods and services 
such as health care, education, and 
housing. Lack of documentation often 
prevents them from obtaining gainful 
employment, resulting in a cycle of 
poverty for generations. In parts of 
Africa, the ethnicization of citizenship 
has created de facto stateless 
populations that can contribute to 
confl ict by taking up arms.
The Justice Initiative is responding 
to the crisis of statelessness with a 
comprehensive approach that seeks 
to implement existing legal norms 
prohibiting discrimination and arbitrary 
deprivation of nationality, while 
promoting an effective international 
framework to guarantee the universal 
right to citizenship. 
Promoting International Norms
Working with a growing number 
of NGOs, the Justice Initiative 
has developed resolutions on 
statelessness and promotes their 
adoption by international bodies such 
as the Offi ce of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), the Offi ce of the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR), the UN Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 
the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, and the African Union. 
The Justice Initiative fi led a brief 
as amicus curiae to help secure a 
landmark ruling in 2005 from the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
In the case of Dilcia Yean and Violeta 
Bosico v. Dominican Republic, the 
court ruled that racial discrimination 
in access to nationality constitutes a 
breach of the American Convention of 
Human Rights. 
The Justice Initiative is working to 
ensure implementation of a landmark 
judgment of the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights on 
the arbitrary denationalization and 
expulsion of black Mauritanians. Tens 
of thousands of black Mauritanians 
were rounded up by police and 
soldiers, stripped of their identity 
documents, and forced across the 
border into Senegal, where they now 
live in refugee camps. Together with 
the African Commission, the Justice 
Initiative is documenting the human 
rights violations suffered by the 
expellees, seeking to bring Mauritania 
into compliance with the Commission’s 
judgment.
Other cases are now being 
prepared, and two cases are pending 
before the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights on behalf 
of stateless populations in Kenya 
and Côte d’Ivoire. For a closer look at 
the Kenyan case, please see Kenyan 
Nubians: Without Papers, Who Are You? 
on page 17.
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Authoritarian governments manipulate media rules to stifl e dissent.





Voices of Freedom 
Muffl ed as 
President Rules
Until the late 1990s, the regime of Cameroon’s 
president, Paul Biya, used violence to mute criticism 
of its policies. Police offi cers and soldiers invaded 
newsrooms with guns drawn. They smashed 
computers and seized printing presses. They chased 
off newspaper vendors and beat up and jailed 
journalists. ✒
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One government critic was Pius Njawé, the owner and 
editor of Le Messager, a newspaper critical of President 
Biya’s policies. Njawé has found himself in police custody 
126 times, so far, and his arrests and prison stays—sharing 
cells, he says, with “gangsters” and “burglars”—made him a 
symbol of the struggle for press freedom in Africa. In 1991, 
the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) made Njawé 
one of the fi rst recipients of its International Press Freedom 
Dangerous Assignments Award. Aft er years of pressure 
from CPJ and other foreign organizations, Cameroon’s 
leadership grew sensitive to criticism of its record on press 
freedom and stopped its heavy-handed tactics.
Now, the Biya regime relies upon loopholes in 
Cameroon’s law on mass communications to muzzle media 
criticism. And it was Pius Njawé’s application for a license 
to operate a radio station that prompted the Open Society 
Justice Initiative to take on Cameroon’s government before 
the African Union’s judicial guardian of human rights: the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
On October 29, 2002, Njawé applied to Cameroon’s 
Ministry of Communication for a license to operate an 
FM radio station. As he awaited the ministry’s decision, 
Njawé acquired transmission equipment. He set up two 
sound studios with digital equipment in a new building 
in the port city of Douala. He hired staff . He dubbed his 
station “Freedom FM.” And he heard nothing from the 
government, despite the fact that the law gives the Ministry 
of Communication a maximum of six months to decide 
whether or not to grant an applicant a license. 
Aft er the six-month period elapsed, Njawé decided 
that the government’s failure to respond to his application 
was tantamount to approval to begin broadcasting. He 
took out newspaper ads announcing that Freedom FM 
would take to the airwaves on May 24, 2003. At noon 
on the preceding day, however, police offi  cers, soldiers, 
and members of Cameroon’s gendarmerie surrounded 
his studios. Th ey sealed the building. Th e Ministry of 
Communication informed Njawé that he had failed to 
follow proper procedures and could not go on the air. Th e 
authorities kept troops around the station for weeks before 
pressing criminal charges against him.
President Biya has led Cameroon for over two 
decades. Analysts say his followers had a simple, compelling 
reason to keep Pius Njawé and Freedom FM off  the air. 
Njawé was a jail-tested critic of President Biya, and in 
2003, Biya was preparing for another reelection campaign. 
Radio is popular in Cameroon, where many voters cannot 
aff ord newspapers. (Le Messager prints about 12,000 copies 
each day, and it is estimated that 15 people read each copy; 
Freedom FM’s signal would have covered an area with three 
million listeners.) By preventing Freedom FM from covering 
the 2004 election, President Biya helped dampen criticism of 
his policies and win himself another seven years in offi  ce.
On behalf of Pius Njawé and Freedom FM, on June 
21, 2004, the Justice Initiative lodged a complaint before 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
against Cameroon’s government. Th e complaint attacked the 
government’s practice of giving radio and television station 
owners only provisional authorization to operate, rather 
than granting them formal broadcasting licenses. It argued, 
among other things, that the issuance of a provisional 
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Community radio is an essential method of communication 
in many parts of Africa. Above, an NGO-funded radio station 
in Mali.
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A billboard in Cameroon promotes the presidency of Paul Biya during his reelection campaign in 2004.
authorization leaves broadcasters in a legal limbo that allows 
the Ministry of Communication to silence them quickly 
and arbitrarily if they anger the authorities. Th e complaint 
also argued that the government’s treatment of Freedom FM 
amounted to an attack on Njawé’s freedom of expression.
Cameroon’s minister of communications, Pierre 
Moukoko Mbonjo, has disputed criticism of the practice of 
issuing provisional authorizations. Th e system, he said, has 
benefi ted radio and television owners because it has allowed 
them to operate without paying licensing fees. Mbonjo said 
Cameroon has more than 60 private radio stations and 
asserted that some of these do not favor the government and 
have not had problems.
Th e complaint before the Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights and the Justice Initiative’s eff orts to 
mediate between Freedom FM and Cameroon’s government 
have had some eff ect. On June 24, 2005, the government 
and Freedom FM signed a settlement agreement. Th e 
government agreed to drop the criminal charges against 
Njawé, to release Freedom FM’s equipment, to grant 
Freedom FM a provisional authorization to broadcast, and 
to process, in a fair and equitable manner, Freedom FM’s 
application for a full license. For its part, Freedom FM 
agreed to drop the complaint before the Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights.
When the government fi nally unsealed the radio 
station in July 2005, however, Njawé found that Cameroon’s 
harsh climate had damaged the studios and much of their 
digital equipment beyond repair. Th e Justice Initiative 
is assisting Njawé’s eff orts to gain compensation for the 
damage and bring Freedom FM to the airwaves. 
As of spring 2007, Freedom FM remained silent and 
Cameroon’s Ministry of Communication had yet to license a 
single radio or television station.
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In a democratic society it is indispensable that state authorities 
are governed by the principle of maximum disclosure.









Until September 19, 2006, no international tribunal 
had ever ruled that citizens of a country have a 
right to information held by their government. On that 
day, however, the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights held that public access to information is 
essential to democratic participation and freedom 
of expression. ✒
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Th e Inter-American Court, an autonomous judicial 
institution, ruled on the application of the American 
Convention on Human Rights, which Chile has ratifi ed. 
Th e aim of the convention is to consolidate in the Western 
Hemisphere a system of personal liberty and social justice 
based upon respect for essential human rights. Th e court 
ruled that countries that have signed the convention 
must develop procedures for releasing government-held 
information that are guided by the principle of “maximum 
disclosure.” Th is means that, with few exceptions, all 
government-held information must be made accessible.
“Th is milestone ruling establishes a precedent that 
other courts and other countries should now follow,” said 
Darian Pavli, the legal offi  cer for freedom of information 
and expression at the Justice Initiative, which helped take 
the case to the Inter-American Court and submitted an 
amicus curiae brief. As support for its ruling, the court cited 
a Justice Initiative report, Transparency & Silence, which 
compares freedom of information laws and practices in 14 
countries, including Chile.
Th e case that produced the ruling, Claude Reyes and 
Others v. Chile, involved an environmental dispute that 
erupted in the early 1990s when a United States–based 
logging company purchased tracts of virgin forest in Chile’s 
swath of Tierra del Fuego, at the southernmost tip of South 
America. Th e company submitted a proposal to the Chilean 
government to extract timber from these lands, made 
an environmental impact statement, and, in 1996, began 
harvesting. Chilean and international environmental groups 
mounted opposition to the logging operation, arguing that it 
would adversely aff ect the region’s fragile ecosystems.
One of these environmental groups was the Terram 
Foundation, whose activists were interested in acquiring 
more information about the logging project. On May 6, 
1998, Terram fi led a request for access to documents and 
information with an agency of Chile’s government, the 
Chilean Foreign Investment Committee, which had vetted 
the logging company’s preliminary foreign investment 
application. On May 19, 1998, the vice president of 
the Foreign Investment Committee agreed to provide 
information only on the amount of the logging 
company’s total investment, which the committee later 
provided to Terram by fax. Th e committee failed, however, 
to respond to Terram’s other requests. Two follow-up 
letters went unanswered. Th e committee provided neither 
information nor any reasons for its failure to provide 
the information.
Terram’s executive director, Marcel Claude Reyes, and 
others sought relief in Chile’s domestic courts. Th ey fi led 
three successive appeals against the committee’s eff ective 
denial of their request, claiming a violation of their right 
to information under the Chilean Constitution and the 
American Convention on Human Rights. Th e Chilean 
Supreme Court summarily dismissed these appeals on July 
31, 1998, saying they were “manifestly ill-founded.”
On behalf of Reyes and the other persons who had 
sought information from the commission, a group of NGOs 
and members of Chile’s parliament fi led a petition on 
December 17, 1998, with the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights, which provides recourse to individuals 
who have suff ered violations of their rights under the 
American Convention on Human Rights. About three 
months later, the Inter-American Commission found 
Chile responsible for multiple violations of the convention 
and recommended that Chile comply with a number of 
measures that sought to remedy the individual violations at 
issue, as well as the systemic shortcomings of the Chilean 
systems for providing access to information and access 
to justice.
On July 8, 2005—that is, aft er seven years of legal 
wrangling—the commission referred the case to the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, asserting that 
Chile had violated Reyes’s and the others’ right of access 
to public information and their right to judicial protection 
under Articles 13 and 25 of the convention and that, by 
virtue of its failure to “ensure the victims’ rights to access 
to information and to judicial protection and [to] have 
mechanisms in place to guarantee the right to access to 
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The results of clear cutting in Chile. A lawsuit challenging 
the practice resulted in an important Inter-American Court 
ruling on access to information.
public information,” Chile had also violated Articles 1.1 and 
2 of the convention.
Th e Inter-American Court of Human Rights had 
never before had an opportunity to consider fully the 
question of whether the convention guarantees a right of 
general access to information held by public authorities. 
Th e Justice Initiative joined with four other groups—
ARTICLE 19; Libertad de Información Mexico-Asociación 
Civil (LIMAC); Instituto Prensa y Sociedad of Peru; and 
Access Info Europe—to fi le an amicus curiae brief in 
support of Reyes and the others. Th e brief argued that a 
fundamental right of people to access information held by 
their governments has been established internationally and 
that this right is contained in the American Convention 
on Human Rights. Th e brief also asked the court to rule 
that the convention guarantees a general right of citizens to 
information held by public authorities and that Chile had to 
improve its access to information law and honor requests for 
information in the future.
In its judgment, the Inter-American Court concluded 
that Article 13 of the convention contains a right of general 
access to government-held information and that Chilean 
authorities had violated this right. Article 13, the court said, 
“supports the right of persons to receive such information 
and the positive obligation on the state to supply it,” except 
in the few cases where access is limited by the convention, 
and said “information should be provided without a need to 
demonstrate a direct interest in obtaining it.”
Th e court highlighted the connection between 
freedom of expression and information and rights of 
democratic participation in concluding that “access to 
information held by the State . . . permits participation in 
public governance.”
“[I]n a democratic society it is indispensable 
that state authorities are governed by the principle of 
maximum disclosure, which establishes the presumption 
that all information should be accessible, subject to a 
restricted system of exceptions,” the court stated, before 
concluding that the burden is upon the state “to prove 
that in setting restrictions on access to information in its 
possession it complied with the restrictions” laid out by 
the court.
Th e court ordered Chile to provide the information 
requested about the logging project. In addition, the court 
ordered the state to train public offi  cials on the right of 
access to information, noting with concern that “various 
elements of proof presented in this case coincide in showing 
that public offi  cials do not respond eff ectively to information 
requests.”
Th e judgment of the Inter-American Court is expected 
to have an important impact on the development of the 
right to information at the national level in the Americas. In 
those countries where the American Convention has been 
incorporated into domestic law, individuals and groups can 
now simply cite the Claude Reyes judgment to assert a right 
of access to government-held information.















IT Freedom of Information 
and Expression Program
Freedom of information and expression 
is essential to an open society. The 
Justice Initiative promotes these 
intertwined rights as a foundation 
for government accountability, civic 
participation, and the democratic 
process. 
Freedom of Information
The ability of citizens to hold their 
governments accountable and 
to participate fully in democratic 
society depends on their access 
to government-held information. 
History demonstrates that human 
rights and national security are best 
protected when the press and public 
can effectively monitor government 
decisions. By enabling public scrutiny, 
access to information complements 
freedom of expression in safeguarding 
against government abuse, subversion 
of the democratic process, and the 
squandering of public assets. 
Because access to information 
plays such a fundamental role 
in the functioning of democracy, 
the Justice Initiative has made a 
priority of supporting the adoption 
and implementation of freedom of 
information (FOI) laws around the world. 
In 1990, only 12 countries had 
FOI laws. By the end of 2006, 58 
additional countries—throughout 
Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe, 
Latin America, and parts of Africa and 
Asia—had adopted such laws, several 
with support from the Justice Initiative. 
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The offi cial State Archive in 
Tomsk, Russia. Citizen access 
to government-held information 
is a central principle of open 
societies.
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Over the past few years, the Justice 
Initiative has supported adoption of 
FOI legislation in numerous countries 
(including Chile, Croatia, Macedonia, 
Nigeria, and Serbia) and efforts to 
reform weak FOI laws in many more. 
Passage of an FOI law is no 
guarantee of government openness, 
however, and the Justice Initiative has 
also helped to increase and promote 
the full implementation of existing 
laws. In collaboration with partners 
in Albania, Argentina, Georgia, Peru, 
and Romania, the Justice Initiative 
has worked to gain the release of 
information on corruption, public 
health, government contracts, and the 
salaries of government offi cials. In 
Mexico and Peru, the Justice Initiative 
has joined with partner organizations 
to provide technical assistance to 
government bodies, resulting in 
improved systems for receiving and 
processing requests from the public. 
Justice Initiative efforts to promote 
and strengthen enforcement of FOI 
legislation have produced signifi cant 
results. The Access to Information 
Program, a Bulgarian partner NGO, has 
successfully litigated to gain access 
to documents that demonstrated 
corruption in the use of EU funds 
and helped an investigative journalist 
identify the killer of Bulgarian 
dissident Georgi Markov in London a 
quarter century ago. In Albania, the 
Justice Initiative and the Centre for 
Democratization and Development of 
Institutions (CDDI) won Albania’s fi rst 
FOI court case, challenging the central 
government’s refusal to release 
certain information. In Romania, 
advocacy by the Justice Initiative and 
the Romanian Center for Independent 
Journalism—including bringing a 
lawsuit that exposed abusive practices 
by the former government—resulted 
in requirements for Romanian 
government agencies to post major 
advertising contracts online. 
In 2006, the Justice Initiative made 
progress in expanding the passage 
and implementation of FOI laws 
through the following efforts.
Assessing Freedom of Information 
in 14 countries
The Justice Initiative published 
Transparency & Silence: A Survey 
of Access to Information Laws and 
Practices in 14 Countries in September 
2006, which documented how various 
countries did—or did not—honor 
the right of access to information. 
The report analyzed over 1,900 
requests for information fi led and 
found that countries with access to 
information laws performed better 
than those with no law or with 
administrative provisions instead of 
a law. Transparency & Silence also 
revealed that government failure to 
provide information was common: 
47 percent of requests received no 
response, with Chile, Ghana, and 
South Africa performing especially 
poorly. The report highlighted 
widespread inequality in the provision 
of information: requestors from ethnic 
minorities and other marginalized 
groups (such as Roma) consistently 
received less information than other 
requestors, even though their requests 
were identical. Transparency & Silence 
also reported that nongovernmental 
groups play an important role in 
promoting access to information 
as a right: governments are most 
responsive where those groups are 
most active. 
A Landmark Freedom of Information 
Ruling
The research behind the Justice 
Initiative’s Transparency & Silence 
report was cited in one of the most 
important court cases in the history of 
the FOI movement. In October 2006, 
the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights broke new ground in declaring 
that all people have a general 
right of access to government-held 
information. The court’s pioneering 
ruling in the case Marcel Claude 
Reyes and Others v. Chile marked the 
fi rst time an international tribunal 
confi rmed the existence of a full 
right of access to information held 
by the government and other public 
bodies. In the ruling, the court also 
established that countries must train 
public offi cials on procedures for 
releasing information and that they 
must be guided by the principle of 
“maximum disclosure,” meaning that, 
with few exceptions, all government-
held information must be made 
accessible. The Justice Initiative 
helped bring the Claude Reyes case 
to the Inter-American Court and fi led 
an amicus curiae brief. The Justice 
Initiative is now working with in-country 
partners to use the court’s ruling 
to encourage governments in Latin 
America to pass strong FOI laws and 
to implement fully those that already 
exist. For more about Claude Reyes 
and its importance, please see Court 
Ruling on Chile: Democracy Demands 
“Maximum Disclosure” of Information 
on page 33.
The First Treaty on FOI
The Justice Initiative is working, as 
one of only three NGO members 
on the Council of Europe’s group of 
experts, to help draft a robust FOI 
treaty for adoption by Council of 
Europe member states. Once adopted, 
the treaty will be the fi rst multilateral 
treaty in the world guaranteeing 
the right of the public to access 
government-held information.
Access to Information and 
Anticorruption Campaigns
In 2006, the Justice Initiative 
commenced a project in eight 
countries—Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Mexico, Moldova, Peru, Spain, and 
the UK—to monitor information about 
government contracts, especially in 
the oil, gas, and construction sectors. 
F R E E D O M  O F  I N F O R M A T I O N  A N D  E X P R E S S I O N
38
The project aims to bring to light the 
information governments refuse to 
disclose that is necessary to monitor 
corruption. The project will soon be 
expanded to Azerbaijan and other 
countries. 
Development of Freedom of 
Information Resources 
and Networks
The Justice Initiative has helped 
develop resources for FOI activists, 
information commissioners, 
academics, and government offi cials. 
The Justice Initiative helped launch 
freedominfo.org, the leading website 
on freedom of information; the FOI 
Advocates Network (www.foiadvocates.
net), a global network of over 90 
member organizations in 60 countries 
that runs a listserv on access to 
information issues; and the African 
FOI Center, based in Abuja. The Justice 
Initiative conducted a global survey 
that will be published as a guide to the 
best law and practice regarding access 
to information issues. 
Next Steps
Notwithstanding the dramatic 
advances over the past 15 years, 
the right to information remains 
in its infancy. In the coming years, 
the Justice Initiative will expand its 
efforts to promote adoption of FOI 
laws throughout Africa, and will begin 
work in parts of Asia and the Middle 
East. It will continue to support the 
full implementation of laws that are 
already on the books, press for reform 
of weak laws, and fend off efforts to 
water down good laws. It will continue 
to strengthen the development of 
norms by working for the best possible 
treaties, statements of principles, 
and case law at the international and 
regional levels.
Freedom of Expression
Freedom of expression is among the 
most fundamental of rights. It protects 
the ability of individuals to express 
themselves and to share and advance 
knowledge. Democracy cannot survive 
without a free exchange of ideas and 
the ability of citizens to dissent from 
offi cial policy and criticize those who 
govern them. Freedom of speech 
is also increasingly recognized as 
a key contributor to socioeconomic 
development: where policies and 
politics are transparent and can 
be challenged, they tend to more 
effectively serve the common good.
It is for these reasons that the 
Justice Initiative promotes respect 
for freedom of expression, in what 
continues to be a challenging mission. 
Governments in many transitional 
societies—from Central Asia to large 
swaths of Africa to Latin America—
have shown themselves all too willing 
to sacrifi ce free expression and other 
rights to preserve power at any cost.
Unfortunately, many new 
democracies continue to employ 
the same methods, and sometimes 
the very tools of suppression—such 
as criminal libel or sedition laws—
developed by the autocracies or 
colonial powers they replaced. 
The Justice Initiative seeks to 
address these tendencies as well as 
new forms of censorship by exposing 
abuses and fostering the reform of 
antiquated laws that muzzle free 
speech. The Justice Initiative also 
pursues litigation to prompt regional 
and international bodies such as the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
the European Court of Human Rights, 
the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, and the UN 
Human Rights Committee to ensure 
compliance with international free 
expression standards.
Following are several recent 
highlights of the Justice Initiative’s 
work in freedom of expression:
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Confronting Direct Threats to the Press 
and Freedom of Expression
In Gambia and Sierra Leone, the 
Justice Initiative has supported 
constitutional challenges by local 
press associations against legislation 
that suppresses free expression. In 
other countries, including Albania, 
Cambodia, and Costa Rica, as well as 
UN-administered Kosovo, the Justice 
Initiative has worked with local actors 
and reform-minded legislators to 
build better defamation law regimes 
and encourage decriminalization of 
expression. In Costa Rica, for example, 
the Justice Initiative fi rst supported a 
high-profi le libel case fi led by a local 
journalist with the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights. After the 
court found Costa Rica in violation of 
the American Convention of Human 
Rights, the Justice Initiative pursued 
changes in domestic legislation to 
bring Costa Rica’s libel laws into 
compliance with the court’s ruling. The 
Justice Initiative has also challenged 
the use of “institutional libel” to 
silence government critics in Russia. In 
Romanenko v. Russia, a case pending 
before the European Court of Human 
Rights, the Justice Initiative argued 
that government bodies should not be 
allowed to sue and collect damages for 
institutional libel that does not directly 
affect individual offi cials.
Challenging the Growth of Soft 
Censorship
Increasingly, the enemies of free 
expression are employing less visible 
and more sophisticated schemes 
to interfere with the free fl ow of 
information and ideas. These forms 
of subtler “soft censorship” are not 
entirely new, but they are now being 
used on a scale not seen before. 
From the perspective of free speech 
activists, the emergence of soft 
censorship is the price of success: 
as more widespread and effective 
domestic and international exposure 
has raised the costs of heavy-handed 
censorship, governments around the 
world are opting for less obvious, but 
equally effective ways of meddling with 
free expression.
A common form of soft censorship 
is the abuse by governments of 
advertising funds, subsidies, and 
other fi nancial incentives to buy media 
friendship or punish critical voices. By 
allocating such fi nancial favors in a 
discriminatory fashion, governments 
undermine fair media competition 
and promote a culture of silence and 
favoritism.
A year-long investigation by the 
Justice Initiative and the Buenos 
Aires–based Association for Civil 
Rights resulted in the publication 
of Buying the News, a 2005 report 
that documented the widespread 
use of soft censorship in Argentina. 
The report generated extensive 
debate in Argentina and a movement 
to end the abuse of government 
advertising and subsidies. It also 
resonated in other countries in 
Central and South America, where 
the Justice Initiative is now working 
with local groups to address similar 
issues. The Justice Initiative has 
also helped Romanian civil society 
groups to expose and fi nd a solution 
to the widespread manipulation 
of government advertising in that 
country. This effort culminated with 
the passage of new legislation by 
the Romanian Parliament—the fi rst 
of its kind in Eastern Europe—that 
greatly enhanced the fairness 
and transparency of government 
advertising expenditures.
Increasing Access to the Airwaves
The Justice Initiative has focused on 
freedom of broadcasting because 
radio and television are major sources 
of news and information for billions 
of people around the world, yet 
traditionally disadvantaged groups, 
such as indigenous, rural or poor 
communities, are often shunned 
by mainstream media and denied 
communication rights. A growing 
movement of community-based media 
is starting to fi ll this void by using 
television and radio to provide vital 
social and cultural services to their 
communities. Unfortunately, these 
broadcasters often struggle with legal 
segregation and uncertainty about 
their rights. Justice Initiative activities 
have helped broadcasters overcome 
these challenges and serve their 
communities more effectively. 
In Mexico, after decades of legalized 
exclusion of community broadcasters, 
a Justice Initiative–supported effort 
managed to secure the fi rst operating 
licenses for a dozen community radio 
stations. A similar project is underway 
in Guatemala, where the Justice 
Initiative is working with a government-
convened roundtable to reform 
broadcasting laws and implement 
the communication provisions of the 
Peace Accords.
In other contexts, where 
broadcasting is tightly controlled by 
the government, the Justice Initiative 
supports the rights of independent 
voices to free and fair access to the 
airwaves. In Cameroon, the Justice 
Initiative represented an aspiring 
broadcaster in a case brought before 
the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights to challenge the 
government’s arbitrary denial of its 
license application—the fi rst such 
case in the history of the African 
human rights system. The resulting 
settlement obliges the Cameroonian 
government to allow Freedom FM 
radio on the air. For more on this case, 
see Radio in Cameroon: Voices of 
Freedom Muffl ed As President Rules on 
page 29.
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An imperfect institution, the ECCC is attempting to deliver justice 







Chambers in the Courts 
of Cambodia 
When he arrived at Phnom Penh International Airport 
in July 2006, Robert Petit had a daunting task before 
him. As the newly appointed co–chief prosecutor 
of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia (ECCC), he was expected to investigate, 
indict, and try senior leaders and those “most 
responsible” for the 1975-79 genocide that killed an 
estimated 1.7 million Cambodians. After 30 years of 
waiting, Cambodians expected him to deliver justice. 
✒
I N T E R N A T I O N A L  J U S T I C E
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Yet Petit had few resources at his disposal. He had only a 
skeleton staff . Translators and investigators were desperately 
needed. Th e courthouse, located on the far outskirts of the 
capital, was still being painted. Much of the court’s furniture 
and equipment was still in boxes, and its jail cells had not 
been built yet. Th e ECCC had only three years and $56 
million—much less than similar tribunals—to address one 
of the most notorious mass crimes in history. And people 
didn’t just want Petit to bring justice—they wanted him to 
explain why.
Petit is a veteran of international tribunals, having 
worked on special courts for Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Rwanda, 
and East Timor. But even that experience did not fully 
prepare him for the challenges of Cambodia. Comparing 
the ECCC to his previous stints, Petit describes it as 
“working with limited resources and the smallest staff  I have 
seen.” Th e International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), by comparison, had over 1,000 staff ers 
and a budget of $100 million per year.
Beyond budget and staffi  ng, the ECCC presents 
challenges in its very make-up. As the “Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia” name indicates, the 
court’s structure is highly unusual, as is the predominance 
of Cambodian judges and prosecutors. Unlike other hybrid 
tribunals, such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone, that 
also blend international and national laws and personnel, 
the ECCC is largely a national court: Cambodian jurists 
make up a majority of all judges, although at least one 
international judge must concur with the majority for 
a decision to stand. And this “supermajority” system is 
not the court’s only complexity. Th ere are international 
and Cambodian coprosecutors and co–investigating 
magistrates—so rather than leading the prosecution, Petit 
will work together with a Cambodian counterpart, Chea 
Leang. Th is bifurcated structure has created what even 
court personnel refer to as the “Cambodian side” and the 
“international side” of the ECCC and placed a premium on 
cooperation, coordination, and translation services. Even 
the type of food—Cambodian or continental—served in the 
ECCC’s cafeteria has been the subject of dispute.
Such disputes are not surprising given the court’s 
origin. Th e result of seven years of complex and tendentious 
negotiations between the UN and Cambodian government, 
the ECCC is an imperfect institution saddled with 
impossible expectations. It is expected to punish the leaders 
“most responsible” for the mass crimes of the Khmer Rouge 
period, but won’t address the great majority of crimes 
committed by lower-level cadres. It is expected to help 
Cambodians understand the accountability process, but it 
has little funding for outreach to the public. It is expected to 
leave as its legacy an improved justice system in Cambodia, 
but the country’s judiciary is known for corruption and even 
the Cambodian judges on the ECCC have been accused of 
succumbing to political infl uence.
Th e Open Society Justice Initiative, since its inception, 
has devoted substantial eff ort and resources to fi rst ensuring 
that the court was created, and then working for its success. 
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Cambodian Buddhists attend ceremonies marking the 
opening of the ECCC, February 26, 2006.
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Th e Justice Initiative has had personnel on the ground since 
2003 and the organization’s Phnom Penh–based staff  works 
closely with Cambodian NGOs to support the ECCC and 
maximize its impact.
Before the ECCC was established, the Justice Initiative 
was providing input from NGOs, legal scholars, and 
diplomats on the court’s design and functioning. When 
Petit arrived with just three years to address crimes that are 
30 years old, the Justice Initiative provided him with a 50-
page memo detailing sources of evidence he could use in 
his indictments and subsequent trials: everything from the 
locations of mass graves to the contents of old Khmer Rouge 
newsreels.
Its assistance to Petit is just one example of the Justice 
Initiative’s commitment to the ECCC. Th e organization 
has fl own a series of experts to Phnom Penh, to train and 
advise all parts of the court, and provided the court with a 
series of expert papers on topics such as international fair 
trial standards and principles of defense. It conducted “best 
practices” trainings—based on lessons learned from other 
hybrid tribunals—for the ECCC’s prosecutors, investigating 
magistrates, and principal defenders. Th e Justice Initiative 
has also stationed a court monitor in Phnom Penh who 
works alongside a Cambodian legal offi  cer.
Outside of Cambodia, the Justice Initiative has 
worked to increase support and funding for the ECCC, 
briefi ng diplomats and NGOs on the court and encouraging 
donor nations to both engage with the court and support it 
fi nancially. A listserv established by the Justice Initiative is a 
leading source of information about the ECCC.
Of course, the most important audience for news about 
the court is inside Cambodia, where survivors of the Khmer 
Rouge have high expectations but little actual knowledge 
of the ECCC. Th is is especially true in rural areas where 85 
percent of the country’s population lives and where literacy 
rates are low. Many rural Cambodians know nothing about 
the ECCC. Others think low-level perpetrators will be 
punished. Still others believe they will receive compensation 
from the ECCC for their losses under the Khmer Rouge. 
Th ese beliefs were voiced recently at a community 
forum in Kampot, a few hours’ drive south of Phnom Penh, 
organized by the Justice Initiative and a Cambodian NGO, 
the Khmer Institute of Democracy. On a humid night, Nget 
Sok, a widowed farmer, and about two dozen other area 
residents gathered to learn more about the ECCC. Th ey 
heard speakers, who used a pictorial fl ip chart developed by 
the Justice Initiative rather than written materials, describe 
the court, its purpose and function.
Th ey saw a 35-minute documentary fi lm, Waiting To 
See the Truth, in which older Cambodians describe their 
suff ering during the Khmer Rouge period and younger 
Cambodians—some of whom initially laugh incredulously at 
the stories—struggle to understand their country’s past. Th e 
fi lm led to an animated exchange of questions, recollections, 
and suggestions from the Kampot audience.
Generating conversation and understanding about the 
Khmer Rouge and the ECCC is why the Justice Initiative 
commissioned the fi lm and is showing it at community 
forums across the country. Justice Initiative personnel, 
including one working exclusively on outreach, use the 
forums to make the ECCC accessible to rural Cambodians. 
By allowing people to grapple with their personal 
experiences and the nation’s traumas, such outreach work 
can help the country come to terms with its past while 
moving forward. 
In this way, the ECCC can benefi t ordinary 
Cambodians even if—as Nget Sok learned that night—they 
will not receive monetary compensation or see low-
level cadres punished. Th e ECCC itself will also benefi t, 
as the Justice Initiative takes questions, thoughts, and 
recommendations from these outreach sessions back to the 
court in Phnom Penh. As Sok said, “If the Khmer Rouge are 
punished, that is good. But the most important thing is to 
understand.”
Th e Justice Initiative has invested thousands of hours 
and tens of thousands of dollars in supporting the successful 
functioning of the ECCC and helping people like Nget Sok 
to understand the court’s work. Th is is a major investment 
in a court with a complex structure, uneven history, and 
uncertain future. Disputes over the court’s rules and the 
exact amalgam of international and Cambodian law could 
still derail the entire process.
But Petit, for one, is optimistic. “We’ve made a lot of 
progress,” he said, “especially considering the resources we 
have.”
Supporting the ECCC remains a major gamble for the 
Justice Initiative, and one that could still go wrong. But it is 
a risk the organization is willing to take in order to provide 
the justice and accountability that Robert Petit, Nget Sok, 
and the Cambodian people seek.
















The Extraordinary Chambers in 
the Courts of Cambodia building, 
where senior leaders and “those 
most responsible” for the mass 




International justice—the name 
given to efforts to prosecute high 
level perpetrators of mass atrocities 
including genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes—has 
undergone a renaissance since the 
early 1990s. The Nuremberg and 
Tokyo tribunals of the 1940s brought 
individual perpetrators of World War II 
atrocities to justice. After the tribunals 
closed, the international community 
made little effort to replicate these 
institutions for more than 40 years. 
But in response to the horrors in 
Bosnia in the early 1990s and the 
100 days of slaughter in Rwanda in 
1994, the international community 
formed two separate international 
war crimes tribunals to try high level 
perpetrators: the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Since then, 
other more localized international 
justice efforts (sometimes referred to 
as “hybrid tribunals,” because they 
combine international and national 
elements) have emerged in Sierra 
Leone, East Timor, Cambodia, and 
elsewhere. A permanent institution, 
the International Criminal Court, 
came into existence in July 2002 
after 60 states ratifi ed its statute. 
These efforts demonstrate a 
commitment on the part of the 
international community to ensure that 
individualized accountability, rather 
than impunity, becomes the norm in 
response to large-scale violence. 
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Because international justice is 
such a recent phenomenon, the 
Justice Initiative has developed its 
own program to support international 
and hybrid tribunals around the world. 
Many factors will determine the 
success of the international and hybrid 
courts. Some of the most critical are: 
(1) the fairness and effectiveness 
of the investigations, prosecutions, 
and trials; (2) the degree to which 
affected populations are engaged in 
and informed about the workings of 
the courts; (3) the courts’ contribution 
to the long-term capacity building of 
local justice systems and to the sense 
of justice felt by the victims; (4) the 
jurisprudence and practices emerging 
from these courts; (5) the impact on 
peace and security, the rule of law, and 
regional stability; and (6) the extent 
to which the international community 
supports the work of international 
justice mechanisms, both fi nancially 
and politically.
International tribunals are often 
underresourced and lack suffi cient 
state cooperation in facilitating 
arrests and providing information. 
As a result, they must often rely on 
NGOs such as the Justice Initiative 
for additional expertise and technical 
assistance. The Justice Initiative has 
provided assistance to various arms 
of these courts, including the offi ce 
of the prosecutor, the registry (the 
administrative organ of international 
tribunals) the judicial chambers, and 
the defense. The Justice Initiative 
has also engaged in advocacy and 
public education efforts to strengthen 
support for international and hybrid 
tribunals among the UN Secretariat, 
the diplomatic community, the media, 
and the bench and bar. 
Some of the key areas of focus for 
Justice Initiative work in this fi eld are 
the following:
The Extraordinary Chambers 
in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC)
The Justice Initiative views the ECCC 
as the last real chance to bring 
some measure of justice to victims 
of Khmer Rouge–era crimes, and 
thus is committed to working with 
Cambodian civil society, all organs of 
the ECCC, the United Nations, and 
other stakeholders to ensure that 
I N T E R N A T I O N A L  J U S T I C E
Former Liberian President Charles Taylor at the Special Court for Sierra Leone in April 2006.
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A Ugandan soldier questions two boys who escaped from the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). The International 
Criminal Court has indicted leaders of the LRA on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including 
the forced enlistment of child soldiers.
the ECCC trials are—and are seen to 
be—independent, legitimate, and fair. 
Since 2003, the Justice Initiative has 
maintained an on-the-ground presence 
in Cambodia to monitor developments, 
engage in advocacy, and provide 
technical assistance to help prepare 
for the ECCC’s establishment. This 
has included a full-time international 
court monitor in Phnom Penh tracking 
the court’s progress, and a resident 
fellow working with the Cambodian 
NGO, Khmer Institute for Democracy, 
on outreach activities, providing 
information on the ECCC to people 
in the provinces and conveying their 
reactions and needs back to the 
court. The Justice Initiative has 
brought numerous experts from other 
international and hybrid tribunals 
to Cambodia to work with NGOs, 
the Government Task Force on the 
Khmer Rouge trials, and ECCC staff 
on a broad range of issues, from 
fundraising to court administration 
and operation to interpretation and 
translation. The Justice Initiative 
has also issued a series of reports 
highlighting the court’s pressing 
needs. In both New York and Phnom 
Penh, the Justice Initiative has 
worked with the UN secretariat and 
UN missions to generate and sustain 
international engagement with the 
ECCC. For more about the ECCC, 
please see Last Best Chance for 
Justice on page 41.
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International Criminal Court
The Justice Initiative works closely with 
the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
helping it function as effi ciently and 
effectively as possible. Among other 
activities, the Justice Initiative assists 
local human rights advocates in 
gathering and presenting information 
of use to the ICC, pursues advocacy 
and public education with governments 
to secure support for the ICC, and 
contributes to building the capacity of 
ICC staff on a range of issues. 
International Criminal Tribunals 
for Rwanda and the former 
Yugoslavia
The International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) have ceased opening 
new investigations, are functioning at 
full trial capacity, and are expected 
to fi nalize all appeals and close 
down in 2010. Because of this, the 
courts’ completion strategies have 
already been implemented and they 
have begun transferring some cases 
to national courts. Closing these 
two tribunals requires consideration 
of residual war crimes issues, 
including how to deal with indictees 
arrested after the courts have ceased 
operations, what happens when 
new evidence is discovered which 
could exonerate someone convicted 
by either court, how requests by 
persons convicted should be handled 
(such as requests for early release), 
how witness protection issues will 
be maintained, initiated, and/or 
monitored, what happens to the 
courts’ archives, and other judicial 
and nonjudicial issues inherent in a 
criminal judicial process. The Justice 
Initiative is spearheading efforts to 
establish a Residual War Crimes Offi ce 
that will take up these issues and 
help determine the ongoing legacy of 
these courts. 
The Justice Initiative continues 
to actively engage with the ICTR 
on gender issues and handover, as 
the court transfers more cases to 
domestic courts in Rwanda as part of 
its completion strategy. With the ICTY, 
the Justice Initiative pursues advocacy 
efforts aimed at securing the arrests 
of accused war criminals Radovan 
Karadzic and Ratko Mladic and their 
transfer to the ICTY, while determining 
how to best capitalize on the vast 
evidence developed against Slobodan 
Milosevic before his death.
Special Court for Sierra Leone
Charles Taylor, the former president of 
Liberia, was arrested in early 2006, 
marking the capture of the court’s 
highest profi le indictee. Security 
concerns within West Africa prompted 
the UN Security Council to transfer 
Taylor to The Hague, where he will be 
tried by the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone using the International Criminal 
Court’s premises. The Justice Initiative 
is providing technical assistance to 
help the SCSL prepare for Taylor’s 
trial. To read more about the Justice 
Initiative’s pursuit of Charles Taylor, 
please see Civil Society Pressure: 
Ending Charles Taylor’s Asylum on 
page 9. 
Beyond the Taylor case, the Justice 
Initiative undertakes assessments 
of the court’s operations, facilitates 
the court’s public outreach, enhances 
the quality of jurisprudence through 
submission of amicus briefs, and 
develops and implements projects 
to ensure that, when it concludes 
operations, the court leaves a positive 
legacy in West Africa and elsewhere. 
East Timor
In 2004, representatives from the 
Justice Initiative and the Coalition for 
International Justice traveled to East 
Timor and Indonesia and coauthored 
the report Unfulfi lled Promises: 
Achieving Justice for Crimes Against 
Humanity in East Timor. The report 
served as a foundation for advocacy 
that helped lead to the establishment 
of a Commission of Experts to review 
the justice failures in East Timor 
and Indonesia. The Justice Initiative 
has since partnered with other civil 
society organizations in supporting the 
commission’s call for accountability for 




In 2006, the Justice Initiative 
participated in a training for Iraqi 
judges and prosecutors (organized 
by the Global Justice Center) and 
contributed to workshops on other 
potential tribunals for crimes 
committed in Afghanistan, Burma, 
Burundi, Lebanon, and Liberia. It 
has also undertaken a tribunal 
assessment project to examine the 
impact of the ICTY and other tribunals 
and derive lessons that could be 
useful to future courts.
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All Kinds of Disputes
There are about 100 lawyers and 6 million people living 
in Sierra Leone. Ninety of these lawyers reside and 
work in Freetown, the country’s capital city. But most of 
Sierra Leone’s people are like Pa Lansana, Kadiatu T., 
and Macie B., living in rural villages far from the courts 
and lawyers in Freetown. They are mired in poverty. They 
cannot afford to pay lawyer fees. They cannot afford to 
pay arbitrary fi nes. And they do not understand or trust 
the country’s corrupt legal system. ✒
L E G A L  C A P A C I T Y  D E V E L O P M E N T
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✒
So, what is Pa Lansana, the aged patriarch of a rural 
family, to do when tenant farmers refuse to pay for using 
his family’s land and a corrupt tribal chief related to the 
farmers levies one fi ne aft er the next upon the patriarch and 
his family?
Who will compensate Kadiatu T., a tobacco vendor, 
when a policeman takes a cigarette on credit, then beats her 
until she is unconscious; when she must pay for her medical 
care; when the policeman struts around her village boasting 
of his deed; when her friends say in Creole, “na fo biya 
no mo”—“one should bear, nothing more,” and tell her to 
ignore the injustice? 
And what is Macie B. to do when the deaths of her 
three children lead to accusations that she is a witch, when 
her family shuns her, when she is pregnant and does not 
have enough to eat? 
And what are thousands more victims of domestic 
violence, child abandonment, corruption, police abuse, 
economic exploitation, abuse of traditional authority, and 
violations of rights of employment, education, and health
to do?
Too frequently, people like these resort to violence. 
And it has been this way for years. In fact, many men and 
boys who went to fi ght during the 11 years of Sierra 
Leone’s civil war were frustrated with their poverty, 
with the inequality of their country’s social structure, 
with their inability to fi nd justice through institutions. 
Th e wartime violence, most of it directed at civilians, 
made matters worse. And most of the men and boys who 
committed the estimated 4,500 wartime killings and 6,000 
abductions, who maimed untold thousands of children, and 
who used sexual violence as a weapon of terror still live in 
the country.
Timap: Team Up for Justice
Resolving the interpersonal disputes that fuel much of the 
frustration simmering beneath the surface in Sierra Leone 
is crucial for preventing future explosions of violence and 
building a viable, open society. For this reason, Sierra 
Leone’s National Forum for Human Rights and the Open 
Society Justice Initiative initiated a program to organize 
community-based paralegals to deliver urgently needed 
justice services to impoverished people like Pa Lansana, 
Kadiatu T., and Macie B. Th is program has evolved into an 
independent organization called Timap for Justice, which 
was cofounded by Vivek Maru, an American-trained lawyer 
and Justice Initiative fellow, and Simeon Koroma, a lawyer 
from Sierra Leone. 
Timap for Justice, like any eff ort to resolve disputes in 
Sierra Leone, must deal with three overarching realities. 
First, Sierra Leone’s institutions are dysfunctional. 
Th e government has minimal resources. Corruption is 
rampant. Communication is diffi  cult. Inadequate health and 
education systems have left  a shortage of healthy, educated 
economic actors. 
Second, power in Sierra Leone is concentrated in the 
hands of powerful men, known as di big man dem, at every 
level from the country’s president, di pa, or “the father,” 
down to the village chief, school principal, or head of the 
village farmers’ association. 
Th ird, Sierra Leone has two legal systems: a formal 
legal system, which is concentrated mostly in Freetown and 
survives as the legacy of Sierra Leone’s former colonial ruler, 
Great Britain; and a parallel, customary legal system, which is 
far more relevant for most of Sierra Leone’s people. 
Customary law varies by tribe, it is not codifi ed, and 
it is supposed to comply with the national constitution and 
not contradict “enactments of parliament” or “principles 
of natural justice and equity.” But these formal limitations 
are seldom if ever enforced. Di big man dem, the tribal 
chiefs, or paramount chiefs, appoint the chairmen of 
local courts that act as arbiters of disputes brought to the 
customary legal system for resolution. Th e paramount chiefs 
and the elders they favor have almost all the say over how 
the local courts function. Favoritism and excessive fi nes 
are commonplace in the customary legal system. A lack of 
independent review of decisions exacerbates substantive and 
procedural unfairness. 
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Aft er a needs assessment, Timap for Justice hired 
and trained 13 paralegals for fi ve chiefdoms, three in the 
southern part of the country and two in the north. Th e 
project directors, who are attorneys, spend more than half of 
every month traveling between the program’s eight offi  ces, 
reviewing the paralegals’ handling of cases, working directly 
with selected clients, and providing training on pertinent 
areas of the law or the workings of government. Oversight 
boards, appointed by community members and approved by 
the directors, monitor the paralegals’ work to ensure that the 
program is serving the needs of each chiefdom’s people. 
For problems involving individuals—for example, 
a woman beaten by her husband or a juvenile wrongfully 
detained by the police—the paralegals provide information 
on rights and procedures and assistance in dealing with 
government and chiefdom authorities. If both parties in a 
dispute are interested in a settlement, the paralegals conduct 
a structured, six-step mediation process that includes all of 
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Timap’s paralegals rely primarily on mediation, backed up by litigation when necessary.
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the parties, family elders, or other mutually respected people 
from either side. For community problems—for example, 
the broad problem of domestic violence in the community 
or the general problem of detention by police of juveniles 
along with adults—the paralegals engage in community 
education and dialogue, advocate for change with both 
traditional and formal authorities, and organize community 
members to undertake collective action. 
Litigation is a tool at Timap’s disposal, and this carries 
signifi cant weight. But Timap’s actual litigation capacity 
is small. Only Simeon Koroma is qualifi ed to appear in 
court. And the organization has chosen to litigate only 
as a last resort and only for a small number of cases that 
have had the possibility of either making a signifi cant legal 
impact or have involved particularly severe injustices and 
an unwillingness of the parties to respond to paralegal 
advocacy or negotiation. 
Timap’s paralegals tackle a much wider range of 
disputes than a typical legal services program. Villagers 
in one chiefdom, for example, approached Timap paralegals 
to complain that they had been cut off  from basic services 
because of the condition of the feeder road that connects 
their community to a main road; in response, paralegals 
organized village residents for a day of voluntary, collective 
road maintenance. Timap’s paralegals have mediated child 
neglect cases, land disputes, contested cases of wrongful 
detention, and helped farmers apply for a grant of seed rice. 
Th e cases of Pa Lansana, Kadiatu T., and Macie B. 
illustrate how Timap’s approach secures justice under the 
most diffi  cult conditions.
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A Timap paralegal discusses a case with local community leaders.
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Th e Case of Pa Lansana. Aft er exhausting his money 
paying fi nes to a paramount chief related to the families 
who refused to pay for the use of Lansana’s land, Pa 
Lansana approached the Timap offi  ce. A paralegal took a 
statement, read it back to Pa Lansana, and had him ink his 
thumb and press it on the paper. Th e paralegal explained 
that the paramount chief ’s actions had violated the Local 
Courts Act and that Pa Lansana had the right to appeal. 
Th e paralegal presented Lansana’s case to the local court 
supervisor, who raised the issue with the customary law 
offi  cer; both the supervisor and the law offi  cer visited the 
chief, who, faced with a government lawyer from Freetown, 
a bigger man than himself, agreed to remand the case to 
the local court and refund some of the fi nes Pa Lansana 
had paid. In the meantime, the paralegal paid a courtesy 
call to the paramount chief to make sure the case had 
not badly damaged their relations, because a vindictive 
paramount chief could shut down one of Timap’s offi  ces in 
an instant. Later, before the local court, Pa Lansana won 
the underlying dispute over compensation for use of his 
family’s land. 
Th e Case of Kadiatu T. Aft er a month of inaction by the 
internal disciplinary board of the police department, 
Kadiatu T. and her boyfriend came to the Timap offi  ce in 
Freetown. A paralegal assured Kadiatu T. that if the police 
offi  cer did beat her in the way she described, then the 
offi  cer committed a serious violation of the law. 
Th e paralegal took interviews that generally confi rmed 
Kadiatu T.’s story. He wrote a letter on Timap letterhead 
to the police offi  cer, recounting the allegations, asserting 
that they amounted to serious infractions, and inviting the 
offi  cer to visit the Timap offi  ce to tell his side of the story. 
Th e offi  cer showed up and, aft er some discussion, admitted 
his wrongdoing. Th e paralegal informed him that Timap 
would monitor the proceedings in the police disciplinary 
board and, depending on the outcome, would consider the 
possibility of a civil suit for damages. Aft er leaving Timap, 
the offi  cer approached senior police offi  cers to intercede for 
him with Kadiatu T., and she agreed to accept the offi  cer’s 
apology and promise that he would pay her 138,000 
Leones (about 46 U.S. dollars), which is no small sum in 
Sierra Leone. She also agreed to drop her complaint with 
the internal disciplinary board. Timap for Justice did not 
fi nd out about the arrangement until Kadiatu T. came to 
the offi  ce the following week to report that the police offi  cer 
had paid only part of the money he had promised. Th e 
paralegal spoke to the senior offi  cers, and eventually all the 
money was paid. 
Th e Case of Macie B. Family members brought Macie B. 
to Timap. “What do you want us to do with this child?” 
they asked. “She is a confessed witch. She gave three of her 
children to witches to be eaten. Her husband’s family has 
returned her to us and left  the village. We haven’t money 
to support her. We fear her ourselves. What do you human 
rights people have to say about this?” 
Timap’s local paralegals were at a loss. Under 
customary law, Macie B.’s confession was reason enough 
for her husband’s family to “return” her, and for her own 
family to refuse to take her in. Under formal law, her 
family had no obligation to care for her, because she was 
no longer a child. Th e paralegals set aside their own beliefs 
in witchcraft  and focused on saving Macie B. from being 
abandoned by appealing to love and applying tribal custom 
rather than law. 
“We have listened, and we respect the seriousness of 
the situation,” the paralegals told Macie B.’s family members. 
“We want to remind you, though, that this is your daughter. 
You brought her into this world. She has nowhere else to 
turn.” Th ey also tried to convince them that the deaths of 
her children might have been due to neglect rather than 
witchcraft  and that she needed help now because she was 
pregnant again. Th e family agreed to continue to shelter 
Macie B. despite the scarcity of food in their household. 
Timap’s codirectors Simeon Koroma and Vivek Maru gave a 
small amount of their own money so Macie B. could visit a 
clinic for prenatal care and purchase some additional food. 
Aft er the birth of Macie B.’s child, one of the members 
of Timap’s community oversight board, a part-time diviner, 
prepared a meal and held a ceremony for Macie B. to 
exorcise the witch. Th e strategy worked: Macie B. was 
welcomed back into her husband’s family. But her baby soon 
died. Sierra Leone has the world’s highest infant and child 
mortality rates.















IT Legal Capacity 
Development Program
In many countries around the world, 
lawyers with the courage and skills 
needed to defend human rights and 
pursue cases in the public interest 
are scarce. Expanding human rights 
protections and the rule of law hinges 
on developing local capacity to 
spearhead change in legal practice 
and advocacy. One of the principal 
ways to achieve this is to create 
opportunities for local actors to 
learn by doing. Through the Justice 
Initiative’s Legal Capacity Development 
(LCD) Program, aspiring human rights 
advocates receive professional training 
in litigation, advocacy, technical 
assistance, research, and writing. In 
the long term, creating and sustaining 
growth in human rights requires a 
critical mass of skilled and committed 
advocates. 
The LCD program promotes skills 
and opportunities for human rights 
advocacy among young lawyers and 
seeks to develop a culture of public 
service in the legal profession. The 
Justice Initiative works to develop legal 
capacity in two principal ways: through 
clinic-based training programs and 
human rights fellowships. 
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A student in Afghanistan studies 
for exams. The Justice Initiative 
worked with the International 
Legal Foundation to open a 
criminal defense clinic at Herat 
University. Such clinics offer law 
students hands-on experience.
Clinical Legal Education
The Justice Initiative’s clinical legal 
education project operates through 
university-based legal clinics: faculty and 
student-run legal aid offi ces that provide 
pro-bono legal services to the most 
vulnerable members of society. These 
clinics offer front-line justice services 
to the poor and disenfranchised, in 
areas ranging from criminal defense to 
community legal empowerment to legal 
assistance for people with HIV/AIDS.
University-based legal clinics require 
only modest fi nancial and human 
resources. But in addition to providing 
legal services to those who otherwise 
would not receive them, these clinics 
help introduce new subjects and 
innovative legal teaching methods to 
existing law school curricula. Moreover, 
they provide opportunities for law 
students to gain practical skills while 
developing a human rights and public 
service ethos.
Starting in Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union, where the 
program helped establish nearly 75 
legal clinics, the Justice Initiative has 
created new clinics around the world. 
From Fourah Bay College in Sierra 
Leone to Istanbul Bilgi University 
in Turkey to Panassastra University 
in Cambodia, clinics founded or 
supported by the Justice Initiative now 
help train scores of lawyers a year.
In addition, the Justice Initiative 
seeds new clinics by conducting 
trainings in promising locales. 
Recent trainings have been held for 
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teachers and administrators from 
Afghanistan, Indonesia, Lebanon, 
Malaysia, Nigeria, and Tajikistan. After 
one such training, the International 
Legal Foundation created a criminal 
defense clinic at Herat University in 
Afghanistan, following groundwork laid 
by the Justice Initiative. Preparations 
are underway to establish community 
empowerment clinics at Pasundan 
University and International Islamic 
University in Indonesia, and a public 
interest law clinic at the University of 
the Holy Spirit in Kaslik, Lebanon.
Central Asia Project
The LCD Program has a special focus 
on Central Asia, where it seeks to buld 
the capacity of lawyers to advocate 
for human rights and promote change 
through legal means. Currently, its 
main activity is seeking legal remedies 
for torture, which remains widespread 
in Central Asia. The project provides 
qualifi ed legal counsel to victims of 
torture, helping them obtain redress 
through domestic litigation, and, 
where appropriate, application to 
the UN Human Rights Committee or 
other international mechanisms. The 
project’s concentration on strategic 
litigation is designed to complement 
existing anti-torture activities in the 
region. After starting in Kyrgyzstan, the 
project recently began taking cases in 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
Human Rights Fellowship 
Program
Through its Human Rights Fellowship 
Program, the Justice Initiative works 
directly with lawyers and law students, 
preparing them to pursue human rights 
advocacy and fortifying the growing 
network of advocates essential to an 
open society. The fellows spend one 
year attending human rights courses 
and interning with an NGO, then spend 
a second year working full-time for 
an NGO in their home countries. The 
program provides fellows—all of whom 
come from non-Western countries—
with important fi rst-hand experience, 
while building the capacity of human 
rights organizations. 
One of the Justice Initiative’s 
fellows went on to found Timap for 
Justice, a nonprofi t in Sierra Leone 
that trains paralegals to help fi ll gaps 
in the justice system—gaps that are 
alarmingly common in one of the 
poorest countries in the world. Please 
see Witches and Big Men: Sierra Leone 
Paralegals Resolve All Kinds of Disputes 
on page 49 for more on Timap and 
the cases they take on, from a street 
vendor beaten by a police offi cer to a 
woman accused of being a witch.
In the past fi ve years, the Justice 
Initiative has helped train 81 fellows 
from Africa, Central and Southeast 
Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin 
America. Following are brief profi les of 
selected fellows:
Solomon Abebe (Ethiopia) is a lawyer 
for the NGO Action: Professionals’ 
Association for the People. He 
organizes and conducts human rights 
trainings for judges and prosecutors, 
carries out research, and develops 
human rights training materials.
Renata Arianingtyas (Indonesia) 
is director of the Bridging Diversity 
Program at the Tifa Foundation in 
Jakarta, where she conducts trainings 
in human rights education, confl ict 
resolution, consensus building, and 
interreligious tolerance.
Elvira Habibulina (Kyrgyzstan) is 
director of the Center for Legal 
Assistance for Prisoners, an NGO 
devoted to protecting prisoners’ rights, 
assisting in penal reform, and reducing 
incarceration. She monitors prisoners’ 
rights; provides legal aid to prisoners, 
former prisoners, and their relatives; 
and advocates for the liberalization 
of criminal legislation, with special 
emphasis on the application of 
alternatives to incarceration. 
Akaki Minashvili (Georgia) is a lawyer 
at the Liberty Institute, a Georgian 
human rights NGO. He provides 
free legal counseling to victims of 
human rights violations, focusing on 
freedom of expression and freedom 
of information issues. He is currently 
participating in the drafting of a law 
on freedom of the press, speech, 
and broadcasting, and was actively 
involved in drafting the new Criminal 
Procedural Code of Georgia. 
Marta Villarreal (Mexico) coordinates 
the Clinical Legal Education Program 
and Public Interest Law Clinic projects 
conducted by the Department of Law 
at the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo 
de México (ITAM) where she has also 
worked with the Access to Justice 
Program.
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Most pretrial detainees are jailed without being given access to 
legal representation.






Comes First—Years in 
Pretrial Detention
Sokoto Prison, at the far northern edge of Nigeria, is a 
hot, gritty, dehydrating place to wait: hour upon hour, 
week upon week, never knowing when the waiting 
will end. It was midsummer, July 2003, when Mu’azu 
and Isah Ibrahim, men who survived by fi shing and 
farming, began their wait. Mu’azu was 51 years old, 
his brother 49. ✒
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In the early 1990s, the Ibrahim brothers were involved in 
a dispute over a parcel of farmland in their native village, a 
place called Kabanga. Another village man claimed he was 
the just heir to the plot; the Ibrahim brothers maintained 
that they were the rightful inheritors. Th e man disappeared 
in about 1993. Aft er 10 years, the missing man’s nephew 
made allegations to the authorities that the Ibrahim brothers 
had killed his uncle. Th is was enough information for the 
police to bring the brothers into custody, to transfer them to 
Sokoto Prison, and to leave them there, surrounded by walls 
20 feet high, to wait, without counsel or any other means of 
infl uencing the judicial process that had swept them up. 
Th e brothers were not alone in their predicament. 
Almost two out of every three prisoners in Nigeria’s jails 
today are in pretrial detention—detainees awaiting trial. 
On average, these people languish in custody for more than 
three and a half years, and a few have waited more than 10 
years. Never mind that Nigeria’s constitution requires the 
arraignment of detainees before a court within 48 hours and 
trials for accused persons within a “reasonable” time. Almost 
three-quarters of these detainees have no legal counsel, 
leaving them at the mercy of police offi  cers and criminal 
justice offi  cials who are, in too many instances, corrupt.
Days turned into weeks for Mu’azu and Isah Ibrahim. 
Months passed. Th e seasons changed, as they do even in dry, 
hot Sokoto. And years of prison life ground by behind doors 
that did not open even to allow the brothers a bail hearing.
Reasons for the Endless Waiting
Several factors prolong pretrial detention in Nigeria. 
Responsibility for investigating crimes and managing 
evidence rests with the police, a federal-level agency in 
Nigeria. But 90 percent of the country’s crime occurs at the 
state and local levels, and most trial courts are state-level 
institutions whose prosecutors rely heavily upon supervision 
and authorization by federal offi  cials and agencies. Th e slow 
interaction between these multiple layers of bureaucracy 
leads too frequently to miscommunication and even loss 
of documents.
Nigeria’s police are quick to act fi rst and ask questions 
later, arresting suspects even if only an initial investigation 
links them to a crime. Th e police start their investigation 
in earnest only aft er they make an arrest, but they can only 
release or prosecute a suspect with authorization from the 
director of public prosecutions, which can take more than 
fi ve years to obtain. In 2005, 3.7 percent of pretrial detainees 
were in custody because their case fi les could not be found, 
7.8 percent were in custody because the investigating police 
offi  cers assigned to their cases had been transferred to other 
regions or states, and 17.1 percent were in custody as a result 
of delays in investigations. Nigeria’s courts are not required to 
set time limits on investigations or monitor the duration of 
pretrial custody.
In most cases, the police and the prosecution do 
nothing aft er the magistrates have issued a remand order. 
One reason for this is that promotion of police offi  cers 
and prosecutors depends upon the number of arrests and 
convictions they record.
In too many cases, law enforcement authorities fail 
or refuse to expedite investigation of the allegation and the 
fi ling of a charge in order to obtain bribes from the suspects 
and their relatives.
Most detainees do not receive access to legal 
representation at the beginning of their court cases. Th e 
police frequently deny suspects contact with family or 
lawyers until they have found incriminating evidence or 
extracted confessions—oft en through torture. A 2005 
presidential committee found that 75 percent of suspects in 
pretrial detention have no legal representation of any kind. 
In December 2004, the Legal Aid Council of Nigeria 
and the Open Society Justice Initiative launched a two-year 
pilot project to reduce the number of pretrial detainees 
in the overall prison population in Sokoto and three 
other Nigerian states and to address the underlying causes 
of the problem of inordinately long periods of pretrial 
detention.
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Th e project relied upon the services of trained Legal 
Aid Council lawyers who have been recently called to 
the bar as solicitors and advocates but are on compulsory 
service to the state for one year. Th e lawyers on compulsory 
service are not paid salaries, but receive a monthly 
government allowance to augment stipends from their 
places of primary assignment.
Th e 20 lawyers participating in the pilot states made 
numerous applications to the police, the director of public 
prosecution, and the courts calling for the release of 
detainees on grounds that they had no case to answer or 
for want of diligent prosecution. In some cases, the lawyers 
fi led applications citing the Fundamental Human Rights 
Enforcement Procedure Rules, through which the court 
can unconditionally release persons who are unlawfully 
detained. In other cases, the lawyers fi led applications for 
release of detainees on bail.
Reports by the project team to the chief judges of 
the pilot states led to the release of numerous pretrial 
detainees. Engagement with the police at both the national 
and state levels led to better monitoring of police behavior 
and reduced the incidence of police abuse. Th is monitoring 
has helped raise the levels of professionalism in police 
investigations and reduced delays and arraignments.
A Record of Success
During its fi rst year, the project achieved signifi cant 
successes.
• Th ere were 3,011 detainees awaiting trial in 
the four pilot states at the beginning of the 
project. Within one year, the project’s eff orts 
secured the release of 1,255 (42 percent) of these 
detainees. Th e duration of pretrial detention in 
the four pilot states fell dramatically, including a 
61 percent drop in Sokoto. Th e overall average 
period of pretrial detention in the four pilot states 
before the project was 552 days; aft er one year, 
the project had reduced this average period to 
172 days.
• Th rough the advocacy eff orts of project lawyers at 
police stations and in courtrooms, 636 suspects—
379 of them in Sokoto—were allowed to post bail 
rather than being remanded to prison custody.
• Th e project team developed the trust of the 
police, courts, and other criminal justice agencies 
and their cooperation ensured success where 
past programs failed. On April 28, 2005, for 
example, the inspector-general instructed police 
commanders in the four pilot states to give the 
project’s lawyers unhindered access to police cells 
in order to interview and off er legal advice and 
assistance to inmates. Before this instruction, 
lawyers were rebuff ed at the police stations and 
were told to go to court if they had any complaints 
against the police. 
• Th e chief judges in Sokoto and two other states 
adopted the project’s model procedures, known as 
Practice Direction. As a result, police investigative 
teams have improved their work. Th e chief 
judge in Kaduna state is considering the Practice 
Direction model.
• Coordination has improved among the agencies 
responsible for administering criminal justice.
Sustaining and expanding the reform of Nigeria’s 
pretrial detention regime is possible. Prospects are bright 
for passage of the Administration of Criminal Justice Bill 
and the Legal Aid (Amendment) Bill. Adoption of the 
project’s Practice Direction model by more states will 
broaden implementation of its mechanism for magistrate 
courts to monitor and review pretrial custodial orders. 
Th e police authorities have established human rights 
sections at the divisional, area, and state command levels in 
an eff ort to strengthen respect for human rights, rule
 of law, and due process through better training. Police 
training manuals have been revised to include instructions 
defi ning human rights and how to respect them. Police 
authorities have also reorganized their internal oversight to 
root out corrupt practices and corrupt police offi  cers.
Th ree years passed before Mu’azu and Isah Ibrahim 
found their way out of Sokoto Prison and returned to 
Kabanga to fi sh and farm once more. Th ey stayed in prison 
three years despite the fact that the police had no body, 
and despite the fact that there were no witnesses linking 
the Ibrahim brothers with the disappearance. It took three 
years for legal aid attorneys to convince a court to free them. 
Today, they remain in Kabanga—free on bail.
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Reforming a justice system that made no distinction between
youths and adults.






It began several years ago with a meeting to disabuse 
Kazakh law enforcement professionals of their 
assumptions about young people, imprisonment, and 
the presumption of innocence, as well as their belief 
that, because Kazakhstan had ratifi ed the United 
Nations convention on children’s rights, their juvenile 
justice system was working well. ✒
Even Accused 
Youths Have Rights
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Th e atmosphere in the meeting room in Almaty was at 
fi rst rigid with reticence. Th e shadow of Soviet power still 
hung over lawyers, police offi  cers, and judges gathered 
there. Perhaps they had chatted privately about human 
rights with their close friends, perhaps they had expressed 
frustration over a criminal justice system that made no 
distinction between accused young off enders and hardened 
adult criminals. But openly discussing human rights in 
Kazakhstan had once been a subversive act. Pressuring the 
government to respect human rights was dangerously close 
to a criminal off ense, and anyone who did it might expect 
an invitation from the police for a “discussion.” Publicly 
protesting human rights violations or colluding with 
foreigners to create an organization to safeguard human 
rights meant risking imprisonment.
Th e reticence seemed to absorb every sound in the 
meeting room when people were asked to speak up, to 
admit that human rights violations still exist, right in front 
of human rights advocates once considered subversives and 
the kind of foreigners once considered spies.
Krzystof Pawlowski, a Pole, was one of the foreigners 
in the room, but not really a “foreign” foreigner. Poland, 
though not part of the Soviet Union, had been a Soviet 
satellite for 45 years. Everyone knew Warsaw has a 
wedding-cake skyscraper topped by a star, just like the ones 
that glowed ruby red at night over Almaty. And Pawlowski 
spoke Russian as well as any Kazakh. So his willingness to 
speak out and encourage others to open up made it seem 
less risky.
“How many of you have ever committed a crime?”
He asked to see a show of hands. None went up. 
“Come on,” he said, “none of you ever stole a piece of candy 
or money lying around the house, or maybe a piece of 
jewelry or a watch that you thought no one would miss? 
Maybe when you were very young?”
People began to fi dget. One, two, a few hands 
went up.
“You never smoked when it was illegal because you 
were too young? You never took a shot of alcohol before you 
were 18?”
Pawlowski’s hand went up. Lots of hands went up.
“But no one would suggest that we are criminals.”
His point struck home. Young people make mistakes. 
Even young people who grow up to become police offi  cers, 
lawyers, judges, make mistakes and are not predestined to 
become hardened criminals. So why treat so many juvenile 
delinquents as if they were seasoned, adult criminals?
Group exercises, fi lms, and role-playing games 
followed Pawlowski’s presentation. Th ey lured the police 
offi  cers, lawyers, and judges—professionals who assumed 
they had well-honed powers to determine guilt and 
innocence and incorrigibility—into drawing erroneous 
conclusions due to mistaken identity, false confessions, and 
other factors that send too many of Kazakhstan’s young 
people into prison for years.
Th ese professionals learned that the presumption of 
innocence is a valuable tool to ensure that their criminal 
investigations and judicial proceedings have just outcomes. 
Th ey learned that immaturity, impulsive behavior, and peer 
pressure predispose teenagers to act in ways that are alien to 
their general makeup or to do things they would not do with 
the wisdom of a few more years. Th ey learned that there are 
positive alternatives to coming down hard on the young.
Since 2003, Kazakhstan’s presidential administration, 
its government and courts, a number of local NGOs, the 
Open Society Justice Initiative, and the Soros Foundation–
Kazakhstan have designed and implemented a pilot project 
to build respect in the country’s criminal justice system for 
the rights guaranteed juveniles under the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, other international 
conventions and protocols, and Kazakhstan’s law.
 In June 2005, the chairman of Kazakhstan’s Supreme 
Court declared the pilot project a success. Aft er almost three 
years of operation, the project had signifi cantly improved 
respect for basic rights in the pilot districts:
• In 2002, only 5 percent of juvenile suspects were 
released from custody aft er three days; by mid-
N A T I O N A L  C R I M I N A L  J U S T I C E  R E F O R M
63
2005, 75 to 80 percent of juvenile suspects were 
released within 24 hours. 
• In 2002, about 90 percent of arrests led to the fi ling 
of criminal charges and fewer than 33 percent of 
all cases were resolved before trial; by mid-2005, 30 
to 35 percent of arrests led to the fi ling of criminal 
charges and 66 percent of all cases were resolved 
before trial.
• In 2002, the appointment of defense attorneys 
was erratic; by mid-2005, defense attorneys 
were appointed in all juvenile cases and defense 
attorneys were on call around the clock.
• In roughly 75 percent of the 250 criminal cases the 
project aff ected, the actions of justice professionals 
have shown consistent adherence to international 
standards of juvenile justice.
Attaining the project’s goals required eff ecting 
dramatic shift s in attitudes and practices. Now, with their 
reticence fading, the criminal justice professionals who 
participated in the juvenile justice project are calling 
for incorporating many of the project’s structures and 
procedures into a new, nationwide juvenile justice system. 
By the end of 2006, Kazakhstan’s Supreme Court was 
on the verge of establishing permanent juvenile courts. 
Kazakhstan’s ombudsman submitted his annual report 
on the state of juvenile rights to President Nursultan 
Nazarbayev and made three references to the juvenile justice 
pilot project as he recommended reforms to the justice 
system. Th e Almaty City Bar was preparing to form a group 
to oversee the licensing of defense attorneys qualifi ed to take 
assignments in juvenile cases and work in partnership with 
child advocates. And offi  cials of the Ministry of Internal 
Aff airs, the Offi  ce of the General Prosecutor, the Presidential 
Commission on Human Rights, and the Constitutional 
Council drew upon the project’s components when they 
gave provisional support to the idea of establishing a 
network of juvenile justice commissions to work toward 
improving respect for the rights of juveniles caught up in 
the criminal justice system throughout Kazakhstan.
Th e pilot project demonstrated that reforming 
Kazakhstan’s justice system can improve the lives of many 
thousands of the country’s young people and their family 
members. By applying the lessons learned during the pilot 
project, Kazakhstan has off ered proof that it is striving to 
uphold international standards of human rights in this 
important arena. Th e project has also shown that rights-
based justice can be applied to Kazakhstan’s criminal justice 
system overall and that reform can be a bellwether for 
criminal justice reform elsewhere in Central Asia.
All it might take to begin is a Pawlowski and a show of 
hands.
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IT National Criminal Justice 
Reform Program
Fair and effective justice systems 
based on the rule of law are a 
prerequisite for open societies. 
Conversely, poorly functioning systems 
disserve crime victims, suspects, 
convicted offenders, and members of 
the general public. Essential functions 
of a criminal justice system in an open 
society are safeguarding individuals 
from crime, protecting the rights of 
victims, and assuring due process 
and fair trials for those charged 
with offenses. In many countries, 
widespread fear of crime engenders 
support for repressive measures by 
state and nonstate actors.
The Justice Initiative’s work on 
national criminal justice reform 
promotes the state’s ability to secure 
order and administer justice, so as to 
protect individual rights and enable 
citizens’ full participation in public 
life. To this end, the Justice Initiative 
promotes human rights within the 
criminal justice sphere by pursuing 
three main aims: 
• developing alternatives to and 
reducing the state’s use of 
pretrial detention—the practice 
of holding suspects in jail rather 
than releasing them on bail or 
other forms of security 
• ensuring accountability for 
conduct and performance by the 
police and prosecution, while 
improving their ability to provide 
security to the public 
• broadening access to competent 
legal representation for indigent 
criminal defendants
Pretrial Detention
Excessive pretrial detention not only 
undermines the rights to liberty and 
speedy process, but can cause other 
abuses resulting from overcrowded, 
unsanitary, and dangerous jails and 
detention centers. In this way, it can 
actually contribute to criminality, 
especially for juvenile defendants. 
Pretrial detention often results in 
social and economic hardship for 
detainees and their families. In 
numerous countries where the Justice 
Initiative is active, arrest is often 
arbitrary and vulnerable groups are 
detained disproportionately. 
Consistent with international 
standards, the Justice Initiative aims 
to rationalize the use of pretrial 
detention, and to encourage its use 
only where there is a genuine risk 
of fl ight, obstruction of justice, or 
additional serious criminal activity. 
The Justice Initiative also seeks 
to promote credible alternatives to 
pretrial detention, and to improve the 
capacity of civil society, as well as 
national and regional mechanisms, to 
monitor conditions of detention.
In Mexico, the Justice Initiative is 
working with a local NGO partner, 
Renace, and the state government 
of Chihuahua to develop a pilot bail 
evaluation and supervision center in 
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state’s ability to secure order, while 
protecting individual rights.
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Chihuahua City that has the potential 
to change radically the way pretrial 
detention decisions are made and 
administered. These reforms are 
intended to provide all defendants 
with the right to be considered for 
pretrial release. The project has 
commissioned Mexico’s fi rst cost-
benefi t analysis of pretrial detention 
practices and alternative models to 
pretrial detention, to illustrate the 
price of the current system and bolster 
the case for change. 
More broadly, the Justice Initiative 
is studying efforts to reform 
pretrial detention in 10 countries 
to understand the political impetus 
for, and limits to, change; document 
successes and failures in different 
contexts; and extract empirical 
knowledge for more general 
application. The Justice Initiative aims 
to inform further pretrial detention 
reform efforts by disseminating these 
case studies to donors, governments, 
intergovernmental bodies, and NGOs.
Current Justice Initiative work on 
pretrial detention builds on previous 
successful initiatives, including 
projects to improve the juvenile 
justice system in Kazakhstan and 
reform pretrial detention in Latvia and 
Ukraine. Please see Juvenile Justice in 
Kazakhstan: Even Accused Youths Have 
Rights on page 61 for more about the 
Justice Initiative’s efforts to promote 
changes in Kazakhstan’s juvenile 
justice system.
Law Enforcement Accountability 
and Effectiveness
The Justice Initiative’s work in the fi eld 
of law enforcement accountability and 
effectiveness enhances state capacity 
to promote public security, and create 
a more open and responsive criminal 
justice system. To this end, the Justice 
Initiative has created Indicators of 
Democratic Policing, a sophisticated 
yet practical tool for measuring police 
accountability and responsiveness. 
The Justice Initiative is also 
addressing the use of ethnic profi ling 
by law enforcement authorities in 
Europe in both ordinary criminal 
justice and counterterrorism. A multi-
faceted project in several European 
Union member states is raising 
public awareness through research 
and documentation, pressing for the 
adoption of standards that limit or 
ban ethnic profi ling, and fostering 
the development of collaborative 
approaches to policing that involve 
minority communities as partners. 
In Georgia, the Justice Initiative is 
assisting the prosecutor general in 
developing a community prosecution 
model that will improve how the 
prosecution service understands 
and responds to the public safety 
needs of the community. Community 
prosecution, which originated in the 
United States, is a growing movement 
in countries as diverse as Chile, South 
Africa, and the Netherlands. The 
project in Georgia aims to enhance the 
prosecution service’s accountability 
to the general public, empower 
prosecutors to more effectively deal 
with specifi c endemic crime problems, 
and improve public trust in the 
prosecution service and the criminal 
justice system as a whole.
Legal Aid for Indigent Criminal 
Defendants
Throughout the world, the vast majority 
of people charged with crimes cannot 
afford private counsel. Although 
international standards require 
provision of free and effective legal 
assistance to all indigent criminal 
defendants accused of serious crime, 
in practice many governments fail to 
live up to this responsibility.
The Justice Initiative helps govern-
ments improve the management, 
administration, fi nancing, and 
monitoring of legal services delivery. 
Projects develop and implement 
models of effective legal aid provision, 
carry out research to measure 
the quantity and quality of legal 
representation, and promote local 
development of minimum lawyering 
skills and standards of defense. 
The Justice Initiative also led efforts 
to conceptualize and initiate a project 
on access to justice in Sierra Leone, 
currently run by the NGO Timap for 
Justice, which trains and deploys 
paralegals to provide legal services 
in rural areas of the country. To read 
more about Timap, please see Witches 
and Big Men on page 49.
In recent years, the Justice Initiative 
has supported several legal aid 
reform efforts in Central and Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union. 
For example, a pilot public defender 
offi ce (PDO) in Kharkiv, Ukraine, has 
fi ve lawyers and a paralegal working 
full-time on behalf of indigent criminal 
defendants, and two more pilot offi ces 
will soon open in other parts of the 
country. In Lithuania, the success 
of the Justice Initiative’s model PDO 
led to a new law on nationwide legal 
aid guaranteed and fi nanced by the 
state. Efforts in Bulgaria resulted 
in a new law that restructures how 
the government delivers, funds, and 
organizes legal aid. In other countries, 
including Georgia, Mongolia, Moldova, 
Nigeria, and Kyrgyzstan, the Justice 
Initiative is working with governments 
to lay the groundwork for legal aid 
reform.
















Resource extraction industries such as diamond mining (above, in Sierra Leone) provide 
















that renders the theft of public 
assets, bribery, and money laundering 
impossible, or at least unprofi table, 
would be a signifi cant step toward 
ending resource spoliation, and 
diminishing the likelihood of the 
human rights and environmental 
violations that accompany it.
The initial geographic focus of 
the project is Africa. Activities under 
exploration, in close collaboration 
with local lawyers and NGOs, 
include researching resource-related 
corruption; initiating litigation in 
target countries, in third countries, 
and before international tribunals 
(including the African regional human 
rights protection mechanisms and 
subregional bodies); and providing 
technical input to governments 
seeking to recover looted assets, 
document or prosecute economic 
crimes, and/or review their current 
contractual arrangements with 
extractive industries. The project will 
also aim to build national capacity for 
investigating and remedying fi nancial 
crimes. 
Beginning in mid-2006, the Justice 
Initiative began implementing a pilot 
project to address corruption in 
the resource extraction industries, 
such as oil, gas, and diamonds. 
Corruption linked to natural resource 
extraction often results from a lack 
of transparency in the generation, 
transfer, and investment of revenues. 
Recent efforts, including some 
sponsored by OSI, have aimed to 
create preventive transparency 
mechanisms—both voluntary and 
mandatory—aimed at corporations, 
banks, and governments. The Anti-
Corruption Project aims to utilize 
legal action—civil and administrative 
suits, criminal investigation and 
prosecution, and application of 
regulatory norms—as a complement 
to these preventive transparency 
initiatives. The Justice Initiative plans 
to pursue legal remedies in various 
forums, including the home countries 
of the multinational extractive industry 
corporations and banks. 
To date, much of the legal 
community’s interest in these 
matters has centered on human 
rights violations and environmental 
damage associated with the extractive 
industries. Direct legal responses 
to corruption remain relatively rare, 
despite the fact that spoliation often 
occurs independently of human 
rights and environmental abuses, 
and typically underlies these broader 
problems where they occur. The 
establishment of a legal environment 
A N T I - C O R R U P T I O N
Buying the News: A Report on Financial 
and Indirect Censorship in Argentina
This study examines some of the more 
subtle ways in which government offi cials 
interfere with media freedom and editorial 
independence in Argentina. Government 
offi cials practice indirect censorship by 
using advertising funds and regulatory 
power as carrots or sticks to manipulate 
the media for political purposes, 
rewarding “friendly” publications and 
seeking to bankrupt critical ones. 
Buying the News responds to this offi cial 
interference by offering policymakers, 
journalists, and media freedom advocates 
a comprehensive set of recommendations 
for reform. (2005; 124 pp.; also available 
in Spanish).
Publications Available 
from the Justice Initiative
To order or download the following publications, go to 
www.justiceinitiative.org/publications, or email info@justiceinitiative.org.
“I Can Stop and Search Whoever I 
Want”—Police Stops of Ethnic Minorities 
in Bulgaria, Hungary and Spain
This study fi lls major gaps in what is 
known about ethnic profi ling by police in 
Europe. Using quantitative data as well 
as interviews with police offi cers and 
members of minority groups, the book 
looks closely at the practice in three 
countries whose signifi cant minority 
populations refl ect the changing face 
of Europe. In combining statistical 
analyses, fi rst-person accounts, and 
policy recommendations, the book makes 
clear that ethnic profi ling is taking place 
in all three countries, and that it is both 
discriminatory and an ineffective way to 
fi ght crime. (2007; 106 pp.)
Between Law and Society: Paralegals and 
the Provision of Primary Justice Services 
in Sierra Leone  One of the poorest 
nations in the world, Sierra Leone has just 
100 lawyers to serve a population of six 
million people. So what happens to Pa 
Lansana when he is cheated by a corrupt 
local chief, or Macie B., who is accused of 
being a witch? Between Law and Society 
tells the story of a pioneering organization 
determined to provide justice services in 
Sierra Leone. By training paralegals and 
navigating between the country’s formal 
and customary legal systems, Timap for 
Justice is securing justice for Pa Lansana, 
Macie B., and people like them. Using 
stories from Timap’s case fi les, the book 
examines why and how the paralegal 
approach works and characteristics of a 
successful community-based paralegal 
program. (2006; 34 pp.)
Transparency & Silence: A Survey 
of Access to Information Laws and 
Practices in 14 Countries  The right to 
access government-held information 
is essential to any open society. Yet in 
many countries, access to information 
laws are weak, riddled with loopholes, 
and poorly implemented. Transparency 
& Silence takes a close look at access 
to information laws in 14 countries and 
how they work in practice, and lays out a 
role for NGOs and citizens in promoting 
government openness and accountability. 
By tracking more than 1,900 actual 
requests for information submitted to 
government offi ces in countries ranging 
from Nigeria to Macedonia to France, this 
survey shines a bright light on where and 
how access to information laws work—
and where they don’t. (2006; 190 pp.; 
also available in Spanish)
Ethnic Profi ling in the Moscow Metro
The fi rst report to quantify discriminatory 
policing in Russia, Ethnic Profi ling in the 
Moscow Metro shows that Metro riders 
who look non-Slavic are over 20 times 
more likely to be stopped by police 
than those who appear Slavic. The 
study, conducted jointly by the Justice 
Initiative and the Moscow-based NGO 
JURIX, further fi nds that these stops do 
not prevent crime. This book provides 
a detailed, statistically supported 
examination of discrimination by Moscow 
police. It also looks behind the numbers 
at current police practices and places 
them in the context of law enforcement 
challenges in multiethnic Moscow today. 
(2006; 68 pp.; also available in Russian)
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Monitoring Election Campaign Finance
Adequate disclosure and regulation 
of campaign fi nance are necessary 
prerequisites to controlling political 
corruption. Yet in many countries, laws 
governing campaign fi nance are riddled 
with loopholes and poorly enforced. 
Responding to the growing need for 
practical tools to help monitor and 
fi ght corruption, this book draws on the 
experience of citizens challenging corrupt 
practices in more than a dozen countries. 
It will help NGOs carry out effective 
campaign fi nance monitoring and reform 
programs by providing practical guidelines 
and examples of good practices and 
lessons learned. (2005; 176 pp.)
Legal Remedies for the Resource Curse
When resource extraction companies 
can obtain oil, diamonds, gold, and 
other natural resources through covert 
contacts with unaccountable government 
offi cials, the losers are the people in the 
communities where the wealth originates. 
This report reviews some of the main 
legal instruments used to date to combat 
natural resource corruption—as well 
as new, untested legal remedies that 
appear promising. Focusing on resource 
spoliation in Africa, it provides case 
studies to demonstrate what has and has 
not worked, and identifi es opportunities 
for civil society action. (2005; 82 pp.)
Myths of Pretrial Detention in Mexico
Over 80,000 people languish in Mexican 
prisons, waiting to be tried. They are 
presumed innocent, yet must suffer the 
deprivation of their liberty in violent and 
disease-ridden confi nement. Empirical 
evidence gathered here demonstrates 
that this practice does not increase public 
safety. This report strips away myths and 
rhetoric to show that the use of pretrial 
detention in Mexico is irrational and 
indiscriminate—and growing in frequency. 
(2005; 20 pp.; also available in Spanish)
The Police that We Want: A Handbook 
for Oversight of Police in South Africa
Since the advent of democracy, there 
have been dramatic changes in policing 
in South Africa—but more needs to be 
done. This handbook uses the concept 
of democratic policing as a framework for 
assessing policing in South Africa and 
other countries in transition to democracy. 
The book provides concrete measures 
of police performance and accountability 
and examines how oversight bodies can 
improve policing. Published by the Centre 
for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 
in association with the Open Society 
Foundation for South Africa and the Open 
Society Justice Initiative. (2005; 74 pp.)
Justice Initiatives: The Extraordinary 
Chambers  Thirty years after the Khmer 
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Rouge took power—and following 
years of negotiations between the UN 
and the Cambodian government—the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts 
of Cambodia are fi nally preparing to try 
the remaining Khmer Rouge leaders. 
This issue of Justice Initiatives examines 
the Extraordinary Chambers and the 
challenges of securing justice for the 
victims of the Khmer Rouge. (2006; 160 
pp.; also available in Khmer)
Justice Initiatives: Ethnic Profi ling 
by Police in Europe  Ethnic profi ling, the 
inappropriate use by law enforcement 
of an individual’s ethnic characteristics 
in identifying criminal suspects, is 
widespread but underresearched in 
Europe. This issue of Justice Initiatives 
looks at profi ling by police in Europe and 
explores the methods used in the United 
States and United Kingdom to confront it. 
(2005; 100 pp.)
Justice Initiatives: Human Rights 
and Justice Sector Reform in Africa: 
Contemporary Issues and Responses
Whether addressing media repression 
in Gambia, police reform in Nigeria, or 
citizenship issues across the continent, 
this issue of Justice Initiatives documents 
some of the principal challenges to justice 
sector reform in Africa today, and the 
varied approaches that interested actors 
are pursuing in response. (2005; 72 pp.)
Justice Initiatives: Legal Aid Reform 
and Access to Justice  Examining legal aid 
reform from several different perspectives, 
this issue of Justice Initiatives concerns 
state-provided legal representation for 
indigent persons charged with crimes. 
(2004; 60 pp.; also available in Russian)
Justice Initiatives: The Global Freedom 
of Information Movement  This issue 
of Justice Initiatives looks at freedom of 
information successes and challenges 
around the world, including Nigeria, 
Mexico, and Bulgaria. Other articles 
examine the role of the International 
Criminal Court in resolving confl icts, 
clinical legal education, and efforts in 
Slovakia to consolidate the rule of law. 















IT Board and Staff
András Sajó is a professor in the 
Legal Studies Department and chair of 
Comparative Constitutional Programs 
at the Central European University.
Herman Schwartz is a professor of 
law at American University and co-
director of the Washington College of 
Law Human Rights Center.
Christopher E. Stone is the 
Guggenheim Professor of the Practice 
of Criminal Justice at Harvard 
University’s John F. Kennedy School 
of Government, where he chairs the 
program on criminal justice policy and 
management.
Abdul Tejan-Cole is the deputy 
director of the Cape Town offi ce of the 
International Center for Transitional 
Justice. 
Patricia M. Wald is chief judge on 
the U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. 
Circuit (ret.), and former judge on the 
International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia.
Aryeh Neier (ex offi cio), chair, is 
president of the Open Society 
Institute.
Chaloka Beyani is a senior lecturer in 
international law and human rights at 
the London School of Economics and 
Political Science (LSE).
Maja Daruwala is the executive 
director of the Commonwealth Human 
Rights Initiative, an international NGO 
mandated to ensure the practical 
realization of human rights across the 
Commonwealth.
Anthony Lester, QC, is a practicing 
member of the English bar and a 
Liberal Democrat member of the 
House of Lords. 
Juan E. Méndez is the president of the 
International Center for Transitional 
Justice.
Diane Orentlicher is professor of 
international law at the Washington 
College of Law, American University 
in Washington, D.C., where she has 
taught since 1992.
Wiktor Osiatyn´ski is a professor at 
the Central European University and 
a member of the board of the Open 
Society Institute.
B O A R D  O F  D I R E C T O R S
Board of Directors
71
J U S T I C E  I N I T I A T I V E  S T A F F
James A. Goldston, Executive Director 
Robert O. Varenik, Director of 
Programs 
Zaza Namoradze, Director, Budapest 
Offi ce 
Mirna Adjami, Legal Offi cer, Equality 
and Citizenship 
Sarah Alba, Program Assistant 
Kelly Askin, Senior Legal Offi cer, 
International Justice 
Rasjit Basi, Program Associate 
Mariana Berbec-Rostas, Associate 
Legal Offi cer, Legal Capacity 
Development 
David Berry, Senior Offi cer, 
Communications 
Sandy Coliver, Senior Legal Offi cer, 
Freedom of Information and 
Expression 
Barbara Dente, Administrative 
Coordinator 
Nazgul Ergalieva, Legal Offi cer, 
Central Asia 
Maxim Ferschtman, Senior Legal 
Advisor, Equality and Citizenship
Eszter Filippinyi, Program Offi cer, 
Freedom of Information and 
Expression 
Anna Fischer, Program Coordinator, 
Legal Capacity Development 
Indira Goris, Program Offi cer, Equality 
and Citizenship 
Tracey Gurd, Associate Legal Offi cer, 
International Justice 
Julia Harrington, Senior Legal Offi cer, 
Equality and Citizenship
Ken Hurwitz, Legal Advisor, 
Antii-Corruption Project
Maxwell Kadiri, Associate Legal 
Offi cer, Africa 
Katy Mainelli, Director of 
Administration 
Rachel Neild, Senior Advisor, National 
Criminal Justice Reform
Chidi Anselm Odinkalu, Senior Legal 
Offi cer, Africa 
Anna Ogorodova, Associate Legal 
Offi cer, National Criminal Justice 
Reform 
Darian Pavli, Legal Offi cer, Freedom of 
Information and Expression 
Heather Ryan, Khmer Rouge Tribunal 
Monitor, International Justice 
Martin Schönteich, Senior Legal 
Offi cer, National Criminal Justice 
Reform 
Katalin Szarvas, Program Associate, 
Legal Capacity Development and 
National Criminal Justice Reform 
Réka Takács, Program Assistant 
Denise Tomasini-Joshi, Associate 
Legal Offi cer, National Criminal Justice 
Reform 

















IT Open Society Justice 
Initiative
The Open Society Justice Initiative, 
an operational program of the Open 
Society Institute (OSI), pursues law 
reform activities grounded in the 
protection of human rights, and 
contributes to the development of 
legal capacity for open societies 
worldwide. The Justice Initiative 
combines litigation, legal advocacy, 
technical assistance, and the 
dissemination of knowledge to secure 
advances in the following priority 
areas: national criminal justice, 
international justice, freedom of 
information and expression, and 
equality and citizenship. Its offi ces are 




The Open Society Institute works to 
build vibrant and tolerant democracies 
whose governments are accountable 
to their citizens. To achieve its 
mission, OSI seeks to shape public 
policies that assure greater fairness in 
political, legal, and economic systems 
and safeguard fundamental rights. 
On a local level, OSI implements 
a range of initiatives to advance 
justice, education, public health, and 
independent media. At the same time, 
OSI builds alliances across borders 
and continents on issues such as 
corruption and freedom of information. 
OSI places a high priority on protecting 
and improving the lives of marginalized 
people and communities. 
Investor and philanthropist George 
Soros in 1993 created OSI as a 
private operating and grantmaking 
foundation to support his foundations 
in Central and Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union. These 
foundations were established, starting 
in 1984, to help countries make the 
transition from communism. OSI has 
expanded the activities of the Soros 
foundations network to encompass 
the United States and more than 60 
countries in Europe, Asia, Africa, and 
Latin America. Each Soros foundation 
relies on the expertise of boards 
composed of eminent citizens who 
determine individual agendas based 
on local priorities.
www.soros.org
copyright © 2007 by the Open Society institute.  
all rights reserved.
no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a 
retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means 
without the prior permission of the publisher.
published by
Open Society institute
400 west 59th Street
new york, ny 10019 uSa
www.soros.org
For more information, contact:
Open Society Justice initiative
400 west 59th Street
















Cover, left to right: Chris Sattlberger, Panos; Jeremy Horner, 
Panos; Khalil Senosi, AP; Misha Japaridze, AP 
Page 2: Mathew Elavanalthoduka, AP Photo/UNMIL
Page 3: Jacob Silberberg, Panos Pictures
Page 4: Sven Torfinn (top) and Chris Sattlberger (bottom), 
Panos Pictures
Page 9: Khalil Senosi, AP Photo
Page 23: Alexei Sazonov, AP Photo
Page 24: Alexander Zemlianichenko II, AP Photo
Page 25: Misha Japaridze, AP Photo
Page 26: Fredrik Naumann, Panos Pictures
Page 30: Crispin Hughes, Panos Pictures
Page 3: Emmanuel Tumanjong, AP Photo
Page 35: Garth Lenz for Forest Ethics
Page 36: Jan Banning, Panos Pictures
Page 38: Jeremy Horner, Panos Pictures
Page 42: Ker Munthit, AP Photo
Page 44: Lex Fletcher, Open Society Justice Initiative
Page 45: George Osodi, AP Photo
Page 46: Sven Torfinn, Panos Pictures
Page 5: Samantha Bent, Timap
Page 52: Matt Muspratt, Timap
Page 54: Dermot Tatlow, Panos Pictures
Page 63: Gary Calton, Panos Pictures
Page 64: Morris Carpenter, Panos Pictures
Page 66: Espen Rasmussen, Panos Pictures
Report on Developments 
2005–2007
Open SOciety JuStice initiative
www.justiceinitiative.org
new yOrk
400 West 59th Street
New York, NY 10019 USA
Tel: +1 212 548 0157
Fax: +1 212 548 4662
budapeSt
Oktober 6 u. 12
H-1051 Budapest, Hungary
Tel: +36 1 327 3100





Tel: +234 9 413 3771






















  |  R
e
p
O
R
t
 O
n
 d
e
v
e
l
O
p
m
e
n
t
S
 2
0
0
5
–
2
0
0
7
